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Introduction
The  last two decades  have been traumatic  ones  for the  countries  of Latin America  and  the  Caribbean
(LAC).  Virtually all have confronted major economic crises and the related social and political strains.  For
many  of them the international  debt crisis of the early  1980s signalled the arrival of their  own economic
crisis, though in a few the timing was different for reasons  related to country-specific  policies or exogenous
shocks.  Crises  involved  macroeconomic  imbalance,  hyperinflation  and  the  resulting  need  to  stabilize;
international payments imbalance calling for structural adjustment away from production of non-tradables
to that of tradables;  output losses  associated with the need to stabilize  and curtail imports; and,  due to the
above combination of events,  rapidly falling  absorption,  real wages,  and living standards.  In an extreme
case like Peru, per capita income fell by 21%  over 1974-85,  while real wages fell by over 50%  (Verdera,
1994;  Cox Edwards,  1992).  For the region as a whole, per capita output  in 1990 was  about 8%  below the
1980 level and per capita  income about 15%  due to the negative  shift in the region's terms of trade over
that decade  (Table  1).
The 1990s  have promised better things. Though per capita output is still a bit below that of 1980 (see Table
2)  and per capita income  nearly  10%  below,  the regional  growth rate  has returned to  the 3-4%  range,
hardly  dramatic but enough to begin the recovery  of per capita incomes-- up by about 6%  over  1990-94
(CEPALC,  1994,  11).  A few really  strong performers--especially  Chile and Argentina--have  created the
hope that others should be able to follow and that the region as a whole might be able  to get back to the
healthy growth rates of the  1960s and 1970s.  Some of the return of optimism  is based  simply on the better
growth performance  of the early  1990s,  some on the dramatic  return of capital,  both flight capital  which
had previously left,  and new foreign capital coming in (Culpeper,  1993),  some on the entry of Mexico  and
the planned entry of Chile  into NAFTA and the expectation  that other Latin countries  will benefit either
from  entry  into  a  trading  block or  the  closer  integration  of countries  in  the block,  and  some  on  the
widespread  more general  belief that the currently  more  market-friendly  economic  policies have  been a
change  for the better vis a  vis those of the pre-crisis period.  How well-founded  are  these hopes? Will a
return to healthy  growth bring a  quick reduction of poverty  and a gradual decline  in the historically  high
levels  of inequality characterizing this part of the world?  This  is an apparent implication of recent analyses
(erg.  Morley,  1994) which  conclude that inequality  tends to rise with recession and  fall with prosperity.
What  policies  will  be  most  important  to  achieve  growth  with  rapid  poverty  alleviation?  Are  the
market-friendly  economic reforms  currently being widely adopted in the region promising  for both growth
and improved  distribution?  This  volume  focuses on the  question of how labour market outcomes,  and
especially  the distribution of income, have been related to economic events and to policy changes  in Latin
America and the Caribbean, with a view to predicting the distribution of the benefits  from expected future
growth.  Its immediate raison d' etre is the accumulating  evidence that the market-friendly  policy shift has
been  systematically  associated  with an  abrupt  and  important  deterioration  in income  distribution.  The
pivotal question is whether this association is or is not a causal one.  If so,  it is urgent to ascertain which
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same  ones  as  are most important  to  a  strong  growth performance.  If not,  it  is  nevertheless  crucial  to
understand  the  source  of worsening,  and  to  plan  remedial  steps.  The  volume  does  not  focus  on  the
implications  of the  end  of the  debt  crisis and the  above mentioned  policy  shift for  economic  growth.
Whether growth will or will not be rapid (say 5%  per year for the region) is tremendously  important,  of
course,  since even a fairly severe worsening of income distribution over the medium term might not be too
difficult  to weather  if average  incomes  were  rising fast  enough  to spread  some  of the  fruits of growth
accruing  to  those  at and  near  the  bottom of the  income  pyramid.  At this  time,  however,  it  would  be
foolhardy to assume that growth will be rapid enough to push distributional concerns  into the background.
One reason is that most of the impressive growth performances in the Third World have taken place  in less
market-friendly contexts,  with Hong Kong and post-1975  Chile perhaps  the only very notable  exceptions.
Another is the obvious problem  which a number of LAC countries have been suffering in the management
of their exchange rates,  the continuing proclivity towards overvaluation  and the resulting  sluggish growth
(Helleiner,  1994).  Finally,  in spite of the new-found access to foreign capital,  gross domestic investment
has  not yet  approached  its pre-crisis  level  of about  25%  (Table  1).  All  of these  problems  might be
substantially  resolved  within five  years  or  so,  but the  grounds  for  such an  expectation  are  not  overly
strong',  so  the  prudent  response  is  to  "be  worried"  about  the  possible  implications  of  any  sharp
deterioration in distribution, along with the other unwelcome evidence--that  temporary jobs, part-time jobs,
and more generally job insecurity are  a growing  feature of labour markets  in the region.
Until their respective  crises,  most LAC countries had,  with varying degrees of intensity, pursued  import
substitution strategies  of development put in place or fleshed out in the early  post-war years.  By the time
the crises arrived,  opinion among economists--in the industrial countries,  the international  institutions  and
the developing countries themselves had, again in varying degree, begun to shift against this strategy.  Some
felt that for countries like those of LAC  it had already made such contributions  as it could make;  others
felt that it had been a mistake from the start and that free trade would have  served these countries better
all  along  (Corbo,  1988).  In fact  several of the countries  of the  region had  been shifting  towards more
outward oriented policies,  Brazil and Colombia undertaking  clear moves in that direction in the late 1960s.
In any case,  when the crises were upon them, their restricted  policy space,  perhaps combined  with a lack
of opportunity  to  consider  policy alternatives,  led  to widespread  adoption  of the  by-then-conventional
policy prescription:  trade and foreign investment liberalization;  labour market reforms to reduce the degree
of regulations  and  constraints  on business;  privatization  and  downsizing  of the  public  sector;  financial
sector reforms;  and tax reforms  designed to simplify the systems,  reduce  the apparent progressivity built
into  income taxes,  replace direct with indirect taxes.
The most-discussed  and perhaps (though less obviously) the most important of these policy  changes is the
liberalization of trade and foreign investment,  which increases the integration  of the Third World countries
into  the  world  economy.  While  many  analysts  feel  that  such  integration  will  foster  better  growth
performances in the LDCs, predictions  as to the employment and distributional  impact of market-oriented
reform packages  in general and trade liberalization  in particular have varied widely and on balance  been
less positive.  The popular view that freer markets  generally  increase inequality has been countered by the
view that trade liberalization should have the opposite effect,  based on the simple Hecksher-Ohlin theory
that the  freeing  of trade  should  shift factor demand  in favor  of unskilled labour  and of agriculture  and
'One  interesting  element of the optimistic school of thought is that a more outward oriented economic system
promotes faster rates of productivity  growth. Most of the studies undertaken to date have suffered from  severe
quality problems,  and,  in my judgment at least,  add up to very  little at this point.
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shifted towards pessimism on this front, however,  is not the predictions  of the theory which are  in any case
ambiguous, but the empirical  evidence on the aftermaths  of liberalization experiences  within the region and
around  the world.  It  is not only that the  transition towards  market  economies  in the  Eastern European
countries  appears to have led to rapidly widening  income inequality,  but that such experiences  have been
frequent  elsewhere  also,  including both industrialized countries  and  a number of developing  ones,  most
prominently  several  from  Latin  America  (Berry  and  Stewart,  1995).  Dramatic  increases  in inequality
occurred  in  Chile,  Argentina,  and  perhaps  also  in  Uruguay,  the  Dominican  Republic  and  Mexico,
concurrent with market- oriented policy packages  which included  trade liberalization as  a central feature.
It is natural that such increases would give pause to other countries contemplating  similar reforms.  While
it  remains  to  be  seen what  has  happened  or  is  happening  in some  of the  other  countries  which have
introduced the reform packages,  and there is a possibility that Costa Rica has somehow avoided paying the
price of increased inequality  (see below) the regional record as it now  stands suggests that any optimistic
expectations  with  respect  to  the distribution  impact  of the  reform  package  should be  discarded.  The
important  question now  is  whether the  impact  in a  given country  will be  negative and  large;  a  neutral
outcome should be cause for satisfaction.  Hence the importance of assessing  the possible dimensions of this
threat and the ways it might be avoided or attenuated.
Latin America has long been noted for the extreme  inequality of incomes  and opportunities  characteristic
of  nearly  all  countries  of  the  region.  The  urgency  of  dealing  with  this  region's  unnecessary
poverty--unnecessary  because average incomes are generally high enough to imply that there would be little
poverty if the income share of the bottom few deciles  were not so low--has  naturally been heightened by
the economic crisis of the 1980s and the sharp declines in per capita  income observed  in many countries.
The negative events of the last twenty years have  changed the expectations  with respect to the future  of
distribution in LAC from  a cautiously  optimistic one to a more worried  one.  During  the  1960s and the
1970S the literature made much both of the high level of inequality  in Latin America and of the perception
that it was worsening.  In the event there seem to be few well confirmed cases  of negative  trends during
this time (Brazil's experience over the 1960s-early  1970s appears  to be one--see Pfefferman  and Webb,
1983). The more striking feature of the 1960S and early 1970s was the absence of any general  trend either
towards equality or  inequality and the stability of distribution over time (lack of volatility) within nearly
all countries  (Berry,  1988).  In the  15 year period 1975-90 Colombia's urban distribution showed a clear
shift toward equality,  with the narrowing  of earnings  differentials  by level of education  an apparently
important factor. This experience  suggested that a number of other countries might be close to  a "turning
point"  in the  evolution  of their  income  distribution2  since  the  rapid  expansion  of the  upper  levels  of
education was a widespread phenomenon in the region.  The slowing of population growth added another
element  of optimism  that  excess  supply  at  the  lower-skill  end  of the  labour market  would  be  a  less
2  Whether interpreted as the Kuznets  turning point or in some other way.  Many countries of the region may have
been close to the end of their  "labour surplus"  phase by the time the debt crisis put an end to the earlier growth
process;  assuming they have not slipped back too far from that turning point during the years of stagnation,  it
might not take many years of healthy  growth for them to enter the tight labour market situation at which low skill
wages begin to rise quickly.
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and expected  future patterns that the new evidence of worsening has emerged to muddy the waters.3
In his important study of the distributional  outcomes of the  1980s  in Latin America, Altimir  concludes  that
the "normal" distributive patterns  in the coming phase of hopefully sustained growth will tend to be more
unequal,  at least in the urban areas,  than in the last stages of the previous growth phase, during the  19704.
Few  students of distribution in LAC  countries seem now to question this view; the main issues  are (i) how
much more unequal will the new post-adjustment patterns be, (ii) whether continued growth under the new
structures will eventually bring about a reduction in inequality,  a question  which could be phrased  in terms
of whether the Kuznets hypothesis or other  "stage of development"  related  considerations  will eventually
come into play, and (iii) whether policy steps can substantially  improve the distributional trends of the next
few decades without disturbing the growth prospects of these countries.
Altimir's overall conclusion with respect to the future is that "the prospects  for poverty alleviation through
growth alone, without improvements of the relative  distribution of incomes  and vigorous social policies,
appear so limited as to be disheartening and seem likely to be counterproductive  for social integration  and,
ultimately,  for sustainable growth"5 ... "the abatement of absolute poverty  will have to lean much more on
social  policy  and  its  effectiveness."  (ibid,  29).  This  is  an  especially  sobering  assessment,  when  one
considers that the only case in which inequality  has begun to abate  after the full implementation of reforms
is Chile, that at least  15 years passed from the beginning  of the process before this happened,  and that the
current distribution remains far more unequal than the pre-crisis  level.  If other  countries  are to suffer the
distribution-worsening  pressures which have been so powerful  in countries  like Chile  and Argentina,  it
would  require  major offsetting  policies  even to  hold  distribution  constant.  If the  new  model  does  not
generate  fast growth  for some  time--and  on this  one  can  only wait  to  see,  given  the  relatively  untried
character  of the model and its important differences  from the policy package  which proved so  successful
in East Asia--the  short and medium run could hold many tensions  and strains.6
3  This discussion  sweeps the many data deficiencies  under the rug.  In fact,  one must admit that all statements
with respect to distribution trends in Latin America are subject to many qualifications,  and the best one can do is
make good guesses.
4 Altimir (1994,  26-27)  singles out Colombia,  Costa Rica,  Uruguay  and perhaps Mexico  as the countries  where
circa-1990  inequality  was  not significantly greater than that of the late  1970s  or early  1980s  and suggests that this
may be due to these being countries in which  "social justice values have traditionally  inbred  institutions,  objectives
of equity have been quite consistently incorporated  in policy design throughout the  adjustment phase,  and both
adjustment and policy reforms  have been approached gradually  and pragmatically".  He notes that gradualism  was
abandoned  in Mexico  in the  last phase of the reform process,  but that this shift coincided with the special  event--
entry into NAFTA.
5  He cites ECLAC,  1990,  which takes a similar position.
6  Though it is easy to identify  many elements of the new model which should improve  efficiency and growth
performance  visa vis which should improve efficiently  and growth performance  vis a vis the old one,  the
relatively hard evidence that such has been the case remains thin. For example,  most of the analyses of total factor
productivity  growth and its positive association with the policy reforms are fragile and unpersuasive.
None of the micro level analysis of this sort constitutes per se a source of strong confidence  in the  model.  The
growth records which countries  achieve will this be the main test of its merits.  Thus far Chile stands out as the
only strong success,  and that after a lengthy  gestation period.
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liberalization-integration  and  other components of the reform policy package  on the labour  market and
labour market outcomes (employment  and unemployment,  the character and quality of employment,  and
income distribution), through detailed looks  at the experience  of a number of countries  of the LAC  region,
comparison among those experiences and  selective use of other information.  Special  attention is directed
to impact on income distribution, both by earners and by families,  on the grounds that the trends in these
variables are the  most meaningful  summing  up of the labour market  impacts  in question.  We draw  on
Canada's  experience  for comparative  purposes  because  of its  high degree  of  integration with  the U.S.
economy and its recent entry into a free trade area with that country.  One of the major foci is the patterns
of wage differentials  between more skilled and less skilled workers,  a matter much discussed in the United
States  and other developed  countries  over the  last decade  during  which  inequality has  increased  in the
majority of such countries (Berry and Stewart,  1995).
This chapter summarizes the empirical evidence on recent income distribution trends in the LAC  countries,
focusing  especially on the timing of changes  in distribution and the hypotheses suggested by that timing.
Before turning to evidence,  we review some of the hypotheses put forward to explain the recent negative
trends  in distribution and/or other worrisome  aspects  of labour market outcomes.
Possible  Explanations for Negative  Distributional Trends
As a-result of deficient data bases and limited quantitative analysis directed to the explanation of levels and
trends in inequality in Latin America or in developing  countries generally,  there is little by way of verified
theory. The Kuznets hypothesis has received a great deal of discussion,  but remains controversial.7 Limited
discussion has also revolved  around the Lewis labour surplus model and the proposition that as  countries
reach the point at which the labour market begins to tighten up the distribution of income may be expected
to  improve  (Berry,  1983).  Among  structural  features,  the distribution of agricultural  land  as  well  as of
other productive assets,  the distribution of education (Knight and Sabot,),  the size structure of firms and
the degree  of openness to  international  markets  have all received  some attention either  in  a static  sense
and/or as features whose change over time may be predicted to contribute  to distributional trends over time
(Bourguinon and Morrisson,  1989;  Fields,  1984).  It has of course long been recognized that the speed  and
pattern of technological  change could have a significant effect on distribution.  There has been less analysis
in developing than in developed  countries  of the impact of the economic or business cycle,  partly because
the sort of cycle so prevalent in the industrialized countries has not been generally present in a similar form
in the LDCs, but Morley's recent work (1994)  presents  an important  analysis of the record of the  1980s
in LAC.
One  can  distinguish three  broad methodological  approaches  to  achieving  a  better understanding  of the
factors  underlying  changes  in  income  and  consumption  distribution:  cross  country  comparisons  of
It is as easy to conclude  that human capital formation will be pivotal in the new world towards which the
countries  of LAC are moving as that the reforms will provide certain benefits.  But the empirical analysis and the
understanding of how various  types of human capital  accumulation affect economic performance are also in their
infancy and hence not a strong reed to build policy on at this time.
*  Note the Williamson books and Bigsten and Fields, etc.
203distribution  outcomes8  and hypothesized  determinants  thereof;  over-time  studies  of the  experience  of
individual countries; and micro-type analysis designed to test for the  evidence that a particular hypothesized
mechanism was indeed  at work. 9
A important aspect of the study of determinants  o distribution involves the relationships  among  the various
relevant  "distributions".  Probably the three main ones to bear in mind are:  (i) the distribution  of income
among earners  (sometimes  limited  to those  with labour  and/or  business  earnings,  i.e.  excluding  those
receiving  only  rents);  (ii)  the  distribution of income  among  families  or persons (usually  ranked by per
capita family income or some variant thereof);  and (iii) the distribution of consumption among families  or
persons--often  argued  to  be  the  most useful  as  a  guide  to  the  distribution  of material  welfare.  The
distribution  of  income  among  earners  is  of  special  importance  because  it  most  directly  reflects  the
functioning  of the economy.  The mapping  from this distribution to the other two  is however  a  matter of
great importance,  since any social assessment of how good  or bad distribution  is has to be based  on them.
With the increasing  prevalence  of multi-earner households  (or at  least with the increase  in the share  of
adults who  work outside the house) the correlation between the distribution of earner income  and that of
family  or personal  income  may have been weakening.  Finally there  is the  functional  distribution  (that
between  factors  of  production--  labour,  capital,  and  natural  resources),  long  a  prominent  tool  in  the
economic theory surrounding  distribution but much less central  to contemporary analysis  of distribution
in LDCs. 1 '  Given the sharp drop in many wage series in LAC countries during the crisis considerably more
marked than the falls  in per capita output  or income),  and their halting  recovery,  an obvious hypothesis
is that the capital share has risen markedly.  But it would be dangerous to take this  for granted until one  can
claim better measurement  of capital income than we can claim at this time.  In summary,  the assessment
of any hypothesis on the determinants  of distribution and its trends,  should,  whenever possible  be carried
out using the full battery  of  "distributions";  there  is  no  guarantee  that the  impact  identified  on  earner
8  It is of course  important not to forget that country-specific  features may be very important  and may make it
difficult to learn from cross country  comparisons  of experience.
9  Thus a test of the impact of trade  levels or trade policy on distribution would tend to distinguish  tradable  and
non-tradeable  goods sectors,  assess their relative factor intensities,  etc.
1°0  It  is less important  in empirical  work than much earlier theorizing would have suggested it should be for two
reasons:  first,  there is a much greater variance  of incomes  earned from  "labour"  in the broad sense of the term
than was built into early models,  hence it is clear that the whole  story about distribution is not incorporated in a
simple concept like the labour share;  second,  it is hard empirically  to estimate the labour share with great
precision,  because much labour income is imputed (part of the general  category  "business" income)  and because
the distribution of capital income  is the least understood  aspect of overall distribution because of the very faulty
data.  Here too, no simple  assumption such as homogeneity  among recipients  of capital  income could be taken
seriously. All this notwithstanding,  it is important to focus on the functional  distribution of  income when one can
do  so with any success.  One of the striking  weaknesses  of most of the  analyses of distributional trends over the
last couple of decades in LAC,  the period of the phenomena of interest to us here,  is the  lack of attempts to asses
trends in the capital  share. A basic methodological problem lies in the fact that one must, as  one approach to it
estimate,  calculate capital  income  as the residual after the estimate of labour income; the estimate of net capital
income (net of depreciation,  the relevant concept) is complicated by its dependence  on the estimate  of
depreciation.  In most national accounts  the rules for estimation of depreciation are arbitrary,  probably not very
valid,  and especially misleading during  periods when the investment  rate is changing quickly and hence  the ratio
of net investment to gross investment is also changing quickly.  Serious analyses of this matter for LAC countries
are few or non-existent.
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survey based distributions are likely to effectively identify the role of capital  income.
Since there is an obvious tendency  for income differences  across groups to perpetuate  themselves through
the process  of bequest  (of capital,  human capital,  work  attitudes,  social contacts,  etc.),  measuring  the
overall distributional impact of any given factor which can be shown to have an effect at some point of time
involves understanding  the dynamic process which underlies the way distributions change  over time.  It has
thus far proven difficult to assess the long run distribution impacts  of presumed  determinants,  because  of
our very  incomplete understanding  of the dynamic process surrounding  distribution.  What does  seem clear
is that there is  a very high level of inertia in income distributions,  so that if one country  achieves a high
level of inequality at an early stage of development and another a high level of inequality,  those differences
will tend to persist for a long period,  perhaps becoming  accentuated  or perhaps becoming  damped but in
either case  staying  strong.  One no doubt oversimplified  interpretation  of the  Taiwan-Brazil  contrast  in
current levels of inequality would be that Taiwan had  a major agrarian  reform early in its  development
process  and Brazil did not,  with the resulting differences  persisting  strongly  over time.
While  our  main  interest  as  in  the  impacts  of the  policy  reforms  and  related  structural  changes  on
distribution, in order not to run too great risks of misreading the evidence it is  important to have  all major
possible  determinants  in mind.  A suggested  list is  presented  below.  The interaction  among  factors  and
between policies and background factors  can be very important,  and some flavor  for main hypotheses  of
this type is provided below.  The categories  distinguished are not mutually exclusive,  and  it may be best
to think of them as alternative  ways of organizing the range of mechanisms  which may  come  into play.
Trade-related  hypotheses  can also involve structure  (since a country's  size and its factor endowment  help
to determine how trade-oriented  it will be),  as well,  obviously,  as policy.
"Stages of Development"  hypotheses have been important since Kuznets (1955)  argued  that there  was a
general tendency  for distribution to worsen in the early stages  of development,  then improve  later on.  He
explained this pattern primarily as  the result of the transition process  whereby  an economy evolves from
a condition in which it is the traditional,  rural low-income  sector dominates  through a middles  phase  in
which both the traditional  sector and the much higher-income  modern sector  are important,  to the final
stage in which the modern sector dominates.  In the  middle phase,  the importance of the two sectors,  each
with its own income  variance but around  quite different  medians,  raises  the overfill level  of inequality.
Kuznets'  own discussions  of the historical  evidence  from now-industrialized  countries has subsequently
been complemented by the work of Williamson ()  and others. In the LDCs,  cross-country  studies have  in
general been consistent wit the hypothesis (e.g. Alhuwalia,  1976) but over-time analyses have not (Fields),
perhaps however because the periods of time for which data have been available  are relatively short.
Various aspects of the economic structure  of a country are expected  to  affect income  distribution.  Most
apparently relevant  is the agrarian structure (distribution of land, tenure  system,  etc);  a strong case can be
made that it not only underlies the degree of a country's  inequality in the early stages of development but
also,  through the inertia  which  characterize  the  evolution  of distribution  in most countries,  many  later
developments  as well.  More generally,  the distribution  of assets appears  almost tautologically to be  an
important  determinant of inequality (Adelman,  1975?; Adelman and Robinson,  1978); the size distribution
of firms or plants, generally  correlated with the ownership distribution of assets,  has also been suggested
as a determinant and built into various models of distribution.
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as its size and resource  endowment,  as well as by its policies.
Elements of societal structure like the ethnic composition of the population,  the prevalence  and impact of
the extended  family, and the evolution of the nuclear family may also have  significant impacts.
Although not our focus here,  the relationship between distribution and the cycle of recession/recovery  is
important both as a hypothesis  in its own right and because the coincidence of timing between the economic
cycle and policy reforms can make  it hard to sort out whether it is economic  downturn or policy changes
which  lies behind  the  observed  increases  in  inequality.  If economic  downturns  were  the  main  factor
underlying the large increases in inequality observed in many LAC  countries,  a positive prognosis  for the
future  would  be plausible.  Both  Morley  (1994)  and  Altimir  (1994)  put  considerable  emphasis  on the
relationship  of distribution  to  the  cycle.  Altimir  notes  that the  fast  growing  countries  tended  to  see
improvements  in distribution during the  1970s whereas the slow growing ones  saw the opposite.  He also
sees some ties in the 19805,  but does not draw much optimism from his reading of the evidence.1' Morley's
stronger conclusion is that during the  1980s improvements almost always coincided with economic  growth
and worsening with downturns.  Our own case studies  suggest the relationship  is less tight than he argues,
with exceptions  (at least partial) being urban Colombia, where  inequality fell through the downturn of the
early 1980s but rose in the context of growth in the early 1990s;  Brazil,  where the most recent downturn
(1990-92)  saw a lessening of inequality;  Costa Rica,  for which Trejos and  Sauna (1994)  report a decline
in the Gini coefficient (among families ranked by per capita income) during the early 1980s crisis  and some
worsening during the recovery which followed;  Dominican Republic and possibly Uruguay  (see below).
Fields and Newton (1994) reach a similar conclusion based on their look at the evidence from Venezuela,
Brazil and Costa Rica. While further research will no doubt throw more light on this issue, the most  likely
general conclusion would seem to be that,  though there is probably  some average tendency for downturns
(upturns)  to  be  associated  with  increasing  (decreasing)  inequality,  there  are  many  exceptions  to  this
relationship  and,  more important  from  our point of view,  the cycle  cannot  explain  the  majority of the
observed changes in inequality  over the last couple of decades  in the LAC countries.' 2 From our practical
perspective,  the main concern  with the cycle  hypothesis will thus be to try to normalize  for it as well  as
" While noting  that the countries  still wrapped up  in recession and  instability at the end of the  1980s (Argentina,
Brazil,  Panama and Peru)  showed levels of inequality higher than at the beginning of the crisis,  he also  observed
that "income distribution improvement-where  they existed-  only took place  along with real wage  increases....;
these are less likely during the stabilization processes  still faced by Brazil and Peru and have not yet occurred
during the current Panamanian recovery.
"Consequently, one should not expect significant  equity improvements  in these countries  as a
consequence of stabilization and recovery.  Indeed,  full deployment  of policy reforms  and associated adjustment
measures-particularly  on the fiscal  front may  still bring a medium-term increase in income inequality."  (Altimir,
1994,  26).  Based on the experiences  of Colombia and Chile,  he concludes  that only modest reductions  can be
expected when countries  attain a sustained growth path.
12 The only possible condition under  in which this conclusion might not hold would be one in which some of the
effects of the cycle occur with substantial lags.  The same problem of not having  a good idea of the lag structure of
the causal relationships  involved plaques  the analysis of the policy changes  as well; some effects may occur
quickly,  others more  slowly. Most serious in this context is the possibility  that some negative effects  are
short-term and to reverse themselves with time.
206possible,  so that the  effects  of the  cycle  do not become too confused  with  those in which  we  are  more
directly interested.
Hypotheses linking technology  to increasing inequality abound at present since it is generally perceived that
we are in the midst of a major burst of technological  change involving  both robotics  and other innovations
which  displace  blue-collar  workers,  together  with  computer-based  displacement  of  certain  types  of
white-collar jobs; the labour favored by these changes  falls in the high skills category.  These  hypotheses
are commonly  put forward to  explain for the rather general trend toward  increasing  levels of inequality
around the world.  At a world level as well as in LAC, however,  it is difficult to disentangle the effects  of
such technological  change from those of globalization,  whose  timing has been rather similar.  Thus  in the
U.S. debate on the sources of the increase  in inequality observed during the  1980s,  these two hypotheses
contend. 13
In the Latin American context two related considerations  must be borne in mind  as one assesses the role
of technological  change.  First, since virtually  all of the countries of the region suffered  serious  economic
setbacks,  either  in the  1980s  or the  1970s  or  both,  most  have  been  in  a  recovery  mode  since  those
set-backs,  which  saw  both  their  growth  and  their  investment  levels  fall  precipitously.  Since  the
incorporation of new technology occurs substantially  through new investment,  technological  change would
presumably be concentrated during the recovery;  a degree of technological updating which might otherwise
have been spread out over a couple of decades might instead occur  in a much shorter period.  Second,  the
opening up to trade (with different relative  focus on pushing  exports vs.  liberalizing  the domestic market
according  to the country  and,  among other things,  its exchange rate policy)  has tended  to coincide  with
recovery in quite a few countries.  It too has pushed technological  adoption and adaptation in certain ways
and probably  tended overall to accelerate that process.  Sorting out the impact of the  "technology factor"
in the  LAC  countries thus  involves  both  taking account  of the evidence  on its  manifestations  in other
countries of the world and disentangling  its effects from those of abrupt changes  in the degree of openness,
of the stage of recovery and of other possible  factors.
13  In the  U.S.  context the initial  studies (e.g.  Revenga  1992;  Murphy and Welch,  1991;  Borjas,  Freeman and
Katz,  1992) put the spotlight on trade competition  as a key factor in the decline of employment  and wages  of
production visa vis non-production workers  in the U.S.  More recent studies (Bound and Johnson,  1992; Berman,
Bound and Griliches,  1994) conclude that the proximate cause is biased technological  change,  such as the
introduction of computers.  They identify the decreasing  ratio of production to non-production  workers within
industries as the crucial determinant of the outcome.  Lawrence and Slaughter  (1993)  rule out the stopler-
Samuelson effect on the grounds that it predicts employment  moving in the opposite direction to relative wages.
Wood (1994)  has  argued that import competition is the dominant source of increasing inequality in the industrial
countries  generally.
207The Policy-Related Hypotheses
Our central  concern  here  is  with the  market-friendly  policies adopted  in varying  degree  by most  LAC
countries over the last decade or so,  including trade and foreign investment liberalization,  privatization and
generally downsizing of the public sector,  labour market reforms,  etc.  It  is useful to specify  some of the
major ideas on the table.
(i) There  are competing  ideas as to why openness matters,  and which aspects of it matter,  but not much
disagreement  that  it  does  not  matter.  The  Heckscher-Ohlin  theory  emphasizes  differences  in  factor
proportions  between exportables and  importables.  Other theories  relate  rate  of technology  adoption and
the type of technology  adopted to degree of openness (Pack,  1992).  Less  often mooted  is the "economies
of scale  in  trade"  hypothesis  whereby,  regardless  of  what  happens  at  the  production  level,  there  are
important economies of scale in the commercial and financial  aspects of international  trade.  This helps to
explain why large firms dominate trade in many sectors  and smaller firms are less involved.  To the extent
that  factor  proportions  are  closely  related  to  firm  size  (there  is  much  empirical  evidence  for  this
relationship)  one would expect  globalization  to favor  the larger firms  and hence to  raise  the returns to
capital and lower those to labour. Unlike  the Heckscher-Ohlin hypothesis,  which tends to suggest differing
impacts  of trade on different types of countries  (e.g.  labour  abundant vs.  capital  abundant)  this theory
might suggest a negative effect on distribution in all countries, though a more marked one  in those where
the static Heckscher-Ohlin  effect also worked negatively.
A  debated  aspect  of  the  trade  policy  question  is  the  appropriate  way  to  think  of  economies  in
Heckscher-Ohlin  terms,  in particular  the number of factors of production  which must be distinguished.
Results can be reversed according to whether  a model with a single  labour factor  is closer to the facts than
one  with  two  or  more  Categories  of  labour  which  bear  different  relationships  of  substitution  or
complementarity  with  other factors.  Simple two factor  or three models  tend  to view agriculture  as  the
sector most penalized by protection, whereas the evidence  from several LAC countries has  suggested that
some agricultural activities are among the most protected.
(ii) Symmetrical  with traditional two-factor trade theory is the proposition that foreign investment  should
improve the functional  distribution  of income  in the host country by raising  the capital/labour  ratio and
hence the ratio  of wages to  returns to capital.  Fenestra and Hanson  (1994),  who link foreign  investment
to widening  wage dispersion between higher skilled and lower skilled workers  in Mexico,  is thinking  of
a different mechanism, one in which activities which are shifted from the source country to the host country
are less capital intensive than average  in the former and more capital  intensive than average  in the latter.
(iii) There  is a considerable  literature in developed countries which reports that unions, minimum wages
and other types of labour market legislation  usually have  the effect of narrowing  earnings differentials.
Among the interpretations  are that they prevent the exploitation of relatively undefended workers,  that they
prevent differences  in ability from being reflected  in different earnings  as much they might otherwise  do,
etc. In developing countries,  though this view has also been prominent,  there is  a competing view that the
protection  of the labour elite increases the inequality of labour  income. What it does to overall distribution
is theoretically  unclear;  it depends in part on how much of the rents taken by protected labour are  at the
expense of capital (and which among the groups of capital owners pay them),  and the extent to which they
are at the expense of the rest of labour (if indeed they are).  This issue has been very little addressed  from
an empirical point of view in LAC countries or other LDCs, but the evidence  from Chile,  Argentina and
other  countries  makes  it  clear that  it must  receive  serious  attention in  general.  Also  relevant  to  this
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has risen substantially  in recent years,  i.e.  the income  differentials  not explained by level of education,
experience,  sector,  etc.  The technology  hypotheses  could suggest that previously unimportant differences
among people in training, education,  and skills among people become  important  as a result of the change
in technology;  differences in capacity to adjust to new technology  could show up in short-run differences
in productivity which were not previously present.  To the extent also that labour  institutions tend to damp
the variance  of income  within categories  defined  by variables like  these,  the waning  influence  of those
institutions  could let differences  appear which were previously  constrained  away from appearing.
A very important  research  issue at this time is the relationship between trends in wages,  wage differentials
and income  distribution.  This is so partly because much of the important research on the impact of trade
and  other reforms  in industrialized  countries has focused  in the first (and usually  also the last)  instance on
their impact on wage structure (by industry, by job position, by level of education,  etc.).  The assumed link
from say  a widening of observed  wage dispersion to a worsening  of income distribution may not be too
risky in such countries,  but the situation is more complicated  in LDCs.  Often the wage series  available are
not representative  of the labour force  in general,  e.g. formal sector manufacturing  wages  may not move
too closely with average wages in the formal and informal  sectors taken together.  With the large  informal
sectors  and  a high level of self-  employment,  wage series are not reliable  guides even to the distribution
of  earner  income,  let  alone  those  of  family  income  or  consumption.  Also,  with  the  sectoral  and
occupational Composition of the labour force sometimes changing fairly fast (a tendency  accentuated by
the rapidly  rising female participation rates  in some countries),  average  wages of all employed workers
may move rather differently  from those  of specific  categories.  Analysis of wage  structure is  as important
in LDCs as in developed countries,  but the subsequent mappings from those trends onto income distribution
is an important challenge.
(iv) Public sector activities create incomes (or "rents",  depending  sometimes  on how one views them) for
the type of worker hired,  and sometimes for those who are well connected.  Most observers  feel these  are
generally middle class and middle income people,  and that the shrinking of this sector will accordingly  be
felt mainly by the middle deciles of the distribution.  But much may also depend on the indirect effects of
the  downsizing.  If former  public  sector  employees  proceed  to  "bump down"  some  in  lower  income
categories,  the ultimate  (general equilibrium) effect might be more  complicated.
(v) To the extent that the prevalence of small (and medium) enterprise has a lot to do with the demand for
labour,  especially relatively  less-skilled labour,  its size and growth rate will be possible  determinants  of
income inequality.  One hypothesis to explain Taiwan's income equality  is the dominance  of small farms
and small firms over the formative part of its development process.  Brazil  is at or close to the other  end
of this spectrum,  and so its level of inequality.
(f) Much income inequality  is directly related  to an unequal distribution of human capital,  which in turn
reflects  the  functioning  of  the  education/training  process.  Educational  access  is  related  to  income
distribution,  especially in countries with important private  educational sectors.  Both the predictions  based
on the character of the ongoing technological  revolution and some evidence from industrial and developing
countries that wage dispersion by education and skill levels has recently been rising,  imply that this is a
major issue for the future.  Though educational  and training  policy does not figure  prominently in our
analysis of the sort of sudden changes in distribution witnessed over the last decade or so (even  10-15 years
is a short period for the impact of policy to manifest itself) it must obviously be assigned a central role in
planning for the future.
209While  all  of the  above  possible  causal  factors  no  doubt  play  some  role  in  the  evolution  of  income
distribution,  some are unlikely to be behind the sharp  changes witnessed  in so many LAC  countries.  This
probably includes educational policy and performance,  small enterprise policy  and performance  (though
less clear are the latter since SSE may have suffered disproportionally from liberalization and or/recession).
Trade  policy, labour policy,  size of public sector, technology change,  and business  cycle factors  are  all
obvious possible candidates.
The Distribution Record of Latin America and the Caribbean. Growth and Trickle-Down  Prior to
the 1980s
As the Latin American countries progressed through the  1960S  and 1970s,  it appeared that  severe poverty
might  be more  or less  eradicated  by another  decade  or so  of "growth without  redistribution"--  that  is,
growth within the context  of an  essentially unchanged and  very high  level of income  inequality. 14 This
outcome was a possibility because of Latin America's  higher  average income than in most of the  Third
World.
Over the period 1950-80 the region's per capita income rose by about 3  % per year.  With the poverty line
which Altimir  (1982)  attempted  to apply across  countries for  1970, poverty  incidence was  about 38%  of
households  (Table 2).i5 The growth  record over  1950-70 would suggest that poverty  incidence  in  1950
(using the same poverty line) was around 65 %  16  ; over 1970-80 it probably fell to somewhere  around 25%.
Had per  capita  income growth  continued  over  the last two  decades  of the  century  at the  3%  per year
observed over  1950-80, poverty incidence would probably have fallen to about  10-15% 17;  with reasonably
effective poverty redressal policies  (targeted employment schemes,  food  schemes,  etc.) of the sort which
can more easily reach a large share of the poor when the incidence of poverty gets down to this relatively
low level,  it would have been realistic to think that no more than a few percent  would have been critically
poor.
Although most countries of the region did not witness major shifts in income distribution during the 1970s,
some patterns hinted at possible changes in the not too distant future. Thus, the sharp increase in real wages
14 As of the  1960s and early  1970s  all of the Latin countries had very high levels of inequality by the  standards
of other less developed countries,  with the exceptions  of Cuba,  by then a centrally  planned socialist  economy,
Argentina and Uruguay;  somewhat less inegalitarian than those but still better than the regional average  were
Chile,  Costa Rica and probably Venezuela.  The most common  explanations  of the lower inequality  in the Southern
Cone  included their higher level of development (e.g.,  farther along in the Kuznets cycle)  with associated
development  of social  security systems, wage protection, etc.  and their greater racial homogeneity.
15 Data were not available for all countries,  but those excluded had only  12%  of the region's population  and were
not obviously atypical  in terms of degree of inequality.  Since the data relate (in all or nearly  all cases) to the
distribution of households ranked by household income.  the  share of people below the poverty  lines might be
somewhat different from what these figures  show, though  it is not clear in which  direction they may  be biased.
16  Assuming the distribution of income for the region as a whole was not dissimilar to that observed  for
Colombia in  1970; Colombia's Gini coefficient was in the middle of the pack at that time.
17 If this extra period of growth brought with it a significant  tightening of the labour market,  it might have been
realistic to expect the income  share of the bottom few decides to rise (though perhaps not the very bottom decile).
210of lower skilled workers  in Brazil during  the "economic miracle"  of the late 1960s and early  1970s,  and
the less dramatic increase in real wages  in agriculture  and some other  sectors of the Colombian economy
suggested that these two economies might be on the verge of a tighter  labour market and continuing wage
increases,  especially  among those lower skilled workers  (Pfefferman and Webb,  1983;  Berry,  1990).
The Crash.  the Halting  Recovery  and the Policy  Response
This happy outcome was of course not forthcoming,  courtesy of the debt crisis and the periods of decline
and difficult  recovery  which  followed.  The  timing  of the  economic  crises  varied somewhat,  with  the
Southern Cone countries  already in difficulties by the mid-1970s,  while  for most of the others  the onset
was signalled by the international debt crisis of the early  1980s. Particularly  severe short period (2-4 years)
declines in per capita  income  were  suffered by Costa Rica,  Chile, Peru and  Venezuela,  while  GDP per
capita fell by over 20%  during the  19805  in Argentina,  Venezuela,  Peru, Bolivia and Nicaragua  (though
the  first two  regained  some of that ground  in  1991-92).  For the  region  as  a  whole  per  capita national
income fell by about  13%  over  1980-85  and has fluctuated  a little with no significant movement either way
since then (Table  1).  A brief spurt of modest growth over  1985-87 petered out by the late  1980s,  the last
three years of which all saw  average growth of less than  1%.  1991  and  1992 were better again,  with an
average of around 3 %.
With this sort of macroeconomic performance  it was obvious  that there would be many  "losers" during this
period.  The only countries which did not suffer  a net decline in gross national  income per capita between
1980 and  1992 are Colombia and Chile.
In one important sense the poor have been the big losers from the  "lost decade"  since the fact of being poor
means that income declines  and/or  lost opportunities to advance  hurt more.
The  debt  crisis  provided  the  push  to  induce  and/or  oblige  the  region  to  jettison  its  trademark
import-substitution strategy  for a more liberalized trading  system, as  well as to move towards  adoption of
the other elements of what is now a standard package  of reforms to labour  markets,  financial markets and
the public sector.  Some countries had already  taken significant steps  away from the traditional  combination
of protectionism and overvalued  exchange  rates  and the resulting bias  against trade.  Both Colombia and
Brazil moved to encourage  exports in the late  1960s;  Colombia's adoption of a crawling peg exchange rate
put an end to the systematic overvaluation of earlier years. These approaches  were qualitatively  similar to
the  East Asian practice  of encouraging  exports  while  continuing  to  protect  imports.  Chile  went  much
farther as the Pinochet regime introduced the most free-trade free-market  system  in the region,  including
a real import liberalization  bringing tariff rates down to lot by  1980;  though they were  raised somewhat
in the mid-1980s the average was back down to  15%  as the decade came to a close (UNCTAD,  1992, 44).
Argentina had an important  liberalization episode between  1976  and  1982, in which the average effective
rate of protection fell from 158%  to 54%  (Gelbard,  1990,  46).  In the second half of the 1980s most of the
countries of the region have initiated significant reforms,  varying in detail and in timing, and having few
if any close precedents  in the developing (or the developed) world.
Distribution and Poverty Effects  of the Policy  Reforms:  Evidence from Country Experience
In any attempt to predict the medium-term future of income  distribution and poverty in Latin America one
can draw both on analysis of how recent trends  in structural variables and in policies would be expected
to affect income distribution, and on a reading  of the record of countries  which have undertaken some  or
211all  of the  reforms  far  enough  back  in  time  to  make  their  experience  useful.  Although  considerable
uncertainty  still surrounds the precise  evolution  of income  distribution during  the crisis  and adjustment
periods in most of the countries of Latin America,  and it is difficult to sort out the effects  of policy  changes
from those of the crisis itself and of longer run structural trends dating back to the pre-crisis years,  analysis
of the record is nevertheless  quite rewarding.  In spite of data problems in some countries  and uncertainties
with  respect  to  the  causal  processes  at work  in others,  one  is  left with  the  powerful  impression  of  a
preponderance  of negative  shifts in distribution around the time of the introduction of policy reforms,  and
the feeling  that this negative  impact  is not fully explicable  by other obvious candidates  like  stage of the
cycle,  rate of inflation,  etc.
With the exceptions noted,  the evidence  discussed below suffers from a  number of defects,  including  in
particular:
(i) changes  in price vectors are not allowed for;
(ii) usually data are available  only for urban areas;
(iii)  capital  incomes  are  inadequately  measured  so  changes  in  the  capital  share  might  go  largely
undetected"8; wealth effects are,  as always,  absent;
(iv) incomes  from secondary incomes are not well recorded;
(v) there are the usual,  numerous, sources  of misreporting;
(vi) apparent  effects  of inflation on distribution may be illusory related  to  lags in the  adjustment of the
wages and prices which are  important to different groups of people.
The evidence which, taken together, points a large finger at the policy package  as the source of increasing
inequality, comes from Argentina,  Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic,  Ecuador, Mexico,  and Uruguay.
In no case with satisfactory quality data do we have clear evidence of the opposite  pattern.  Costa Rica is
a  special  and  important  case  since  it  appears  to  be  an  exception  (distribution  constant  rather  than
worsening);  unfortunately its data suffer a flaw just at the time liberalization was being introduced.  Several
other countries have not undertaken the reform package far enough back in time to  generate useful data
by now, and for others the data  are simply of too questionable  quality. We organize the discussion around
group A of countries whose experiences  appear to share a number of relevant  characteristics.
18  Usually the most useful  and reliable information  comes from household  income surveys,  but their main defect
is the  systematically  weak reporting of non-labour incomes.  When there is no reason to believe that the labour
share has changed markedly or that the distribution of capital income has been altered,  this underreporting is
unlikely to greatly bias the estimated trends.  During the  1980s, however,  there  is some reason to believe that the
capital  share has risen,  as the result of higher interest rates,  on government domestic debt among  other things
(Felix and Caskey,  1989).  During the crises themselves,  a common pattern was government  borrowing  abroad or
locally to shore up the exchange rate;  this facilitated  massive capital flight.  Governments  (e.g. those of Chile and
Ecuador) essentially socialized private foreign liabilities,  which are the  domain of the rich; the Chilean Central
Bank, pushed by the international banks  to act as guarantor of private non-guaranteed foreign loans,  subsidized
debtors  to the tune of about 4%  of GDP over the period  1982-85  (Meller,  1992,  60).  Later,  when the crises had
passed and structural  adjustment begun, high interest rates remained the order of the day as part of the new
financial orthodoxy.  Our understanding  of the net effects of the various impacts on capital incomes during this
period is not adequate to say with certainty that the capital  share has risen by enough to imply an overall trend to
worsening since  the onset of the crises but that possibility must be borne in mind.
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These  three  Southern  Cone  countries  differ  from  the  rest  of the  LAC  nations  in  that  all  introduced
significant liberalizing economic reforms  in the early or mid-1970s,  before  similar efforts were  undertaken
in the other LAC countries. 1 9 These cases thus offer a longer period during which possible impacts  of the
reforms might have  been felt.  In all  cases  serious deterioration  of distribution seems  to  have  occurred,
though the Uruguayan data are somewhat  suspect in terms of quality/comparability  over time.  Argentina
and Chile suffered unusual worsening of income distribution,  with high unemployment  an aspect  of the
period  in question  in  Chile,  and  falling  labour incomes  for the  lower decides  the  dominant  feature  in
Argentina.
Chile's experience  is the most important from our perspective,  since the policy  experiments date well back
in time and,  despite  some vacillations,  the basic strand of policy has been maintained  subsequently.  The
country has had two severe recessions  since  1970,  the first associated  with Allende's overthrow,  as  GDP
fell by 23 % over  1972-75,  and the second with the international debt crisis,  when GDP fell between  1981
and 1982.  After each collapse growth resumed quickly  and was strong,  but their impact was  still to hold
average annual growth over  1970-92 to only 3.2%,  though registering  an impressive  6%  since  1984. Since
1973  the economy has undergone  the most radical policy  "reforms"  of any nation in the region.
As of the  late  1960s inequality was  a little less severe than in most other  Latin countries. 2 0  The data for
greater Santiago  indicate a  sharp  improvement  during the  Allende administration,  followed  by a sharp
reversal such that by  1976 household income inequality  was markedly worse than in the pre-Allende period
and no longer superior to the levels observed in most other  Latin countries (Table  3).21  Less frequent  but
19 As noted above,  Brazil and Colombia had already taken serious steps  to encourage  exports by the late 1960s,
but had not (at this time)  undertaken an important liberalization of imports,  nor imposed  changes on the
institutions governing the labour market.
20 As of 1967-68 the comparable  data from the ECIEL study revealed a Gini coefficient  for the distribution of
income  among households of .451 in Santiago,  compared  to .487  in Lima,  an average of .473 in four Colombian
cities and an average of about 0.43 in two Venezuelan cities (Musgrove,  1978,  36).  Brazil's cities would have
presumably recorded higher figures  and those of Argentina lower ones.
21  Paradoxically,  the data on distribution among  income recipients,  while showing the  same cycle as for the
household distribution,  do not indicate that the  level of inequality was  greater in the late  1970s  than in 1970.  This
anomaly,  still to be fully explained,  does not greatly  diminish the likelihood that household distribution did worsen
significantly.
A problem with the Chilean information,  as with that for Argentina,  is that published distribution data over
time are only available  for greater  Santiago,  not for the  country as  a whole. But Santiago  is probably  fairly
representative  of the country,  as  suggested by the similarity of measured inequality  for the  few years  for
which both city and national data are available.  There is no automatic inconsistency  in the different trends shown
for the income  recipient and the household  distributions,  since the relationship between the two can change with
family composition or with the participation of secondary  workers.  Still, of course, it would be possible to have
more confidence  in the conclusions suggested here if this difference were already  satisfactorily explained.
Another inadequacy of the  available calculations  is their failure to take account of changes  in the relative
prices of the consumption items purchased by different income classes.  Over the course of the  1980s  the increase
in the relative price of food may have made the distribution trends worse than the figures on nominal distribution
of income make them out to be.
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show  one  of the  largest  deteriorations  ever  recorded  statistically  in  a  developing  country,  occurring
primarily between  1969 and  1978 but also over the decade which followed (Table 4).  Since it is reasonable
to assume that distribution at the end of the Allende years was better than that of 1969  (to which the data
refer),  it would appear that the worsening occurred  very sharply over the next 5 years,  consistent with the
evidence  on the household distribution of income.  If the national trend in consumption distribution were
like that of Santiago,  the consumption decline in the bottom quintile of households  over  1969-78  would
have been 40 %  .22  23 Meller reports an increase in poverty incidence from  17%  in 1970 to 45%  in 1985 with
poverty lines not more than 6%  apart (Meller,  1992, 23).  Even if this may somewhat  exaggerate the trend,
there  is  no  doubt  that  poverty  increased  sharply.24  A  special  and  interesting  feature  of the  Chilean
experience  was  the  combination  of make-work  policies  for  low  income  groups  and  targeted  poverty
redressal which  seems to have helped to limit the most serious  poverty  impacts  of the  negative income
trends just discussed.  A number of the policy steps taken by the Pinochet regime  would be expected  to
foster inequality.  The extensive privatization,  mainly carried out during the severe  recession of 1972-74,
led to  acute concentration  of ownership and  the formation of large  conglomerates  (Melter,  1992,  27).1
Curtailment of agricultural credit to small farmers  led to land concentration as  well. Preferential  financing
to small entrepreneurs  was  cut back.  Perhaps  most important  was  the reform  of the  labour legislation,
Note that the suddenness  of the increase  in recorded inequality between  1975  and  1976 may be related to
the severe inflation at that time, which can produce volatility  in the  estimates.
22 Over that period average private  consumption per person fell by about  13%  and the share of the bottom
quintile by 32%
23 In summary,  the short-run movements  of the various distributions  coincide rather closely  and the main
problem with the  Chilean data is the fact that for the most part they are restricted to Santiago.  The main question
is how much of a total shift occurred between the pre-Allende  period and the late  1980s before the  level of
inequality began to diminish. Judging by the consumption distribution figures  (important both because  of their
presumed  greater accuracy  than income  figures and because  they should be a good measure  of welfare) there was
an incredible increase  in the Gini coefficient of twelve percentage  points  (from 0.31 to 0.42).  The household
distribution  series suggests an increase of about five points between  1970 (which seems representative of late
1960s, judging by the series for income recipients) to  1987-89;  the Gini of the household per capita distribution
rose by about 6.5  points.  (In all cases,  of course, the difference  would be somewhat greater  relative to the low
point of inequality  around  1974.)  It thus appears  that the likely increase  in the  Gini of the most interesting
distributions was somewhere  between important  (6 points)  and dramatic (12  points).  Further work is needed to
clarify the magnitude  of the worsening;  the pace and degree of the improvements  now apparently  underway
obviously deserve attention as well.
A strange feature  of the observed record is that the distribution among earners  (recipients)  appears to have
changed little from around  1970 through at least the early  1980s (Riveros,  1985,  334 has  data up to  1983).  This
puts a premium on understanding  the relationship  among the various  distributions,  and in particular that between
the distribution among earners  and among families.
24 The high incidence  of television sets (over 70%),  refrigerators(49 %), radios  (83%)  and bathrooms(74 %) even
in the lowest quintile throws some question on the 45% figure,  though it is true that some of these items probably
became much more prevalent due to the  low prices which came with the import liberalization around  1980.
2 Note that the direct effects of this concentration might be felt almost entirely within the top 10%  of the income
distribution.
214which relaxed worker dismissal regulations,  suspended unions (to 1979,  when they were again authorized
to operate, but with many restrictions),  greatly reduced  the social security  tax paid by the employers  and
reduced other non-wage costs as well.  After the second crisis (1981-1983)  wage indexation was abolished,
replaced by a real wage  "floor",  specified to be the real wage prevailing  in  1979.  Wealth  and capital gains
taxes  were eliminated,  profit tax rates  substantially  reduced,  and public  employment  greatly  cut  back.
Unemployment  rates (for greater  Santiago) rose to unprecedented  levels in the neighborhood of 20-25%
(depending  on the definition used).  Only in  1989 did this rate  fall below  10%  but since then the fall has
been continuous,  to just 5%  in 1992 (ECLAC,  1992, 42). According to Ffrench-Davis  (1992,  15)  average
wages  in  1989  were still 8%  lower in  1970; as  on 1992 they  were probably marginally  above the  1970
level26, a very slow recovery  indeed.  The coverage of the minimum wage was restricted  considerably  and
its  level  fell  in the  1980s.  Fringe benefits  had  been greatly  reduced  from their  1970 level  and  public
expenditure per capita in health care, education and housing had also decreased (Ffrench-Davis,  1992,  14).
One striking feature  of the post-1973 period in Chile and an important aspect of the evolution of the labour
market was  a sharp increase in the relative income of persons with university and vocational secondary vis
a vis those with less education (Robbins,  1994).  This  shift was clearly a proximate  cause  of the  worsening
in income distribution,  but it remains to be explained  exactly why it happened. Robbins'  analysis  indicates
that it was not primarily the result of shifts in the composition of employment among industries,  but rather
a "within sector"  phenomenon.  It may reflect a greater  relative payoff to higher education under a more
open  economy,  a possibility  hinted  at by  the apparent  importance  of university  training  for  small  or
medium firms to achieve success in manufacturing  exports in Colombia (Berry and Escandon,  1994) and
other countries.  It may alternatively be more a result of the dismantling  of union power and  changes  in
labour legislation  in Chile.
Argentina  has  a by-now  lengthy  tradition of  relative  income  equality  together  with  a singularly  weak
growth performance.  Between  1974 and 1988  GNP grew by only 4%;  at the heart of the  crisis (1980-82)
it fell by a dramatic  13%.  Accompanying this macroeconomic  failure has been an unusually sharp increase
in income inequality,  the Gini coefficient among income earners  in greater Buenos Aires rising from about
0.36 over  1974-76 to somewhere within the range 0.41-0.46 from 1978  on (Marshall,  Chapter,  Tables 4A
and 4B). 27  The dramatic  increase  occurred very suddenly between  1976 and  1978 Marshall,  Table  4A).
Since then the level of concentration  has fluctuated without  clear trend;  after falling  in the early  1980s  it
reached  a temporary  peak in  1989  (under intense inflation),  fell back to the previous level  from which  it
has varied little,  although the share of the bottom  30% has continued to fall somewhat;  from an average
of 11.6%  over  1974-76,  it fell to the  10.5 range  in the early  1980s  and was by  1994 down to 8.5%.
One  apparent  determinant  of short-run  movements  in  the level  of  inequality  is  the  real  exchange  rate,
whose  role  is suggested  by  the  short run inverse  relationship,  over  1970-87  at  least,  between  the  real
26 If the  series cited by Ffrench-Davis  (the source of the wage  data is INE) is consistent with that reported by
ECLAC  (1992,  44),  which shows an increase  of 11.7%  over  1989-92,  then the  1992 figure is 3% above that of
1970.
27 Data on the distribution among households in  this  same greater Buenos Aires region and among income
earners in the country as a whole seem to move in parallel with those just cited for those time periods when they
are available,  which does not in either case include much beyond  1980.  As a result it has been necessary to use
the Buenos Aires earner data, but with considerable confidence that they do not misrepresent  the trends which
actually occurred among households in the nation as a whole (Berry,  1990)
215exchange  rate (Argentine currency per dollar) and both the real wage and the ratio  of the real wage  to per
capita  income berry,  1990,  31).  It is plausible,  given the prominence  of wage goods among Argentina's
exports,  that  an  increase  in the  real  exchange  rate  (through devaluation,  for  example)  would,  ceteris
paribus,  lead to a decrease  in the real wage rate and a worsening  of the distribution of income.  But it is
clear that the longer-run worsening of the income distribution cannot be fully explained  by this  link with
the  real exchange rate  since  net worsening  occurred over periods when there was  no net increase  in the
real exchange rate.  Other factors  must therefore have been at work.  Possibly structural changes  wrought
by the change in trade policy worsened  inequality;  the liberalization  episode referred to above led not only
to a fall of 11%  in manufacturing  output between  1976 and  1982, but to a employment reduction of 37%,
as  output per worker rose by a striking 41%  (Gelbard,  1990,  54).  Many small  and medium firms  exited,
while  many  large  firms  cut  employment,  increased  capital  stock and  improved  technology.  It  is  also
possible that the very large capital  flight from the country played a role, by lowering  the amount of capital
available to complement the labour force.  Changes in labour policy almost certainly played a significant
role; the bulk of the increase  in inequality  since the mid  1970s occurred between  1976 and  1978 as the new
military government fixed wages,  repressed trade unions,  eliminated collective  bargaining and the right
to strike,  and reformed the labour code to the detriment  of workers  (Cortes and Marshall,  1993).  Unlike
Chile,  Argentina's  experience at this time was not characterized by high levels of unemployment.
Among the issues in the interpretation of the Chilean and Argentine cases  are whether the traditional (and
still relatively) high levels of social expenditures  in these countries mean that the poor are in fact less so
than they might appear to be, and better able to weather the storm of economic  adjustment  and the effects
of a worsening  distribution of private income.  Table 5 presents some relevant evidence on this point. Chile,
fourth behind  Uruguay, Venezuela  and Mexico in terms of 1988 per  capita GDP (expressed  in constant
purchasing power dollars),  ranked  higher by such other criteria as average years of schooling for adults
of 25 and up (first as of 1980 with 6.1 years),  adult literacy (tied for third in 1985 at 92%), access to health
services (first in 1985-87 at 97%)  and among the leaders  in share of national  income spent by the state on
health  services,  education  and primary  education,  and  expenditure  on and  coverage  of social  security
benefits.  As a reflection of all of these,  the life expectancy  of about 72 was  fifth in the region,  and was
significantly  exceeded  only by Cuba and Costa Rica;  the improvement of 14.7 years between  1960 and
1990 was  exceeded  only  by a  few  countries which  started much  lower,  like Peru and  Guatemala.  The
UNDP's  Human  Development  Report  of  1991  ranked  the  country  second  only  to  Uruguay  in Latin
America in terms of overall  "quality of life".  Ffrench-Davis  (1992,  12)  comments  positively  also on the
country's capacity to build low-cost housing effectively  and on the massive food programs for pre-school
and school  children.  Indicators  like child  mortality continued  to  move favorably  during  the  1970s  and
1980s (though short term movements in these figures may  not be accurate).
Whatever welfare  interpretation  one places on the income  distribution shifts of these last two decades  in
Argentina and Chile,  it is important to consider their causes.  In Chile it may be presumed  that wealth shifts
associated  with the  "socialization"  of the debts of important  economic  actors were  a factor,  as  was the
general favoritism  towards the rich relative  to  the earlier period  (through tax policy,  credit policy,  the
undoing of land reform, etc.).  Although they do not have easily predictable effects,  the fact that there  were
such sharp policy shifts  in trade and in labour market policy naturally puts the spotlight on them as possible
causes.  For  many  observers  the  tearing  down  of labour  market  institutions  is  an obvious  source  of
worsening;  though  this  prediction  would  be  far  from  obvious  in  a  country  with  a  relatively  small
"protected"  segment of the labour force  and a large unprotected  one,  in relatively advanced  and highly
urbanized countries like Chile and Argentina a negative  effect is quite plausible.  Such a worsening might
be especially strong in an economy  where large rents come from  a high productivity  mining (Chile) or
216agricultural (Argentina)  sector and where  the public sector and other service  activities might be thought
of as  living off those  rents.  When the  public  sector shrinks  and  wages  are  more  closely  linked  to the
marginal product of labour in the private sector,  one might expect wages to fall  more than  in many other
types of economy.
The  "economic cycle" has some potential  explanatory power both countries.  The first crash in Chile was
very sharp,  with the decline  over  1972-75  focused  in 1973  and  1975,  especially  the latter.  Among both
recipients and households the big increase in inequality  came in 1976,  suggesting  the possibility of a short
lag.  Household  per  capita  inequality  did  not  rise  at  all  in  1975  according  to  Riveros'  data,  though
household  distribution  did  and  so  did  earner  distribution.  Riveros  (1994,  195)  notes  that distribution
worsened  during the boom related to financial  inflows  over  1978-82.  The other big output  drop was  in
1982,  with earner distribution unchanged  and household  inequality up  a little.  Eventually  inequality has
come down in the wake of fast growth, though this could more likely be a tightening of the labour market.
In Argentina the tie between weak economic performance  and worsening  distribution is  also partial.
Distribution worsened  sharply in both  1977 and  1978;  the first of these saw growth of nearly  5%  (albeit
a recovery from two bad years) and the second a comparable shrinking.  The severe  downturn Of 1988-89
brought  a marked  but quite temporary  worsening,  which  had disappeared  again  even  as  the  economy
continued to shrink in  1990.
As for Uruguay,  its story has fascinating  similarities and differences  with each of the other two countries,
especially  with  Chile.  Protectionism  and  monetary  mismanagement  have  prevailed  over  most  of the
post-war  period,  and  average  growth  has  been very  slow.  For  a  small  economy,  Uruguay  has  been
relatively  closed,  with the export/GDP ratio sometimes  as low  as the 10-14%  range.  Economic  stagnation
and high inflation rates gradually  engendered social and political instability in the  1960s.  Inflation was high
and growth negative in the early  1970s, just before the military  coup  of 1973.  The new economic team
installed  in  1974 introduced  a program  of price  stability  and  relaxed some of the  existing  controls  on
foreign trade  and capital  movements.  Stabilization attempt were  only partially  successful  in cutting the
deficit;  one problem was the  increase  in military  spending.  A military  priority was  to liberalize  labour
markets (Gillespie,  1991,  cited by Allen and Labadie,  1994,  10).  They had a  severe distaste for strikes as
damaging to the nation's well-being. The National Confederation of Workers (CNT) called a general strike;
a few days later it was disbanded and employers  given the right to fire anyone  who did not return to work
(Allen and Labadie,  1994,  11).  12,00 public and 4000 private sector workers were fired,  with employers
taking the opportunity  to rid themselves both of trade union officials  and of workers they  were unhappy
with for other reasons.  The general strike lasted for two  weeks,  after which neither the union movement
nor collective bargaining played any visible  role for  10 years.
Meanwhile,  import licensing  and quotas were  abolished between  1974  and  1977, the level  and dispersion
of tariffs was reduced and export taxes on agricultural goods cut. The average growth of just over 4%  per
year  over  1974-78  was  led by  export-oriented  industrial  activities--clothing,  leather  goods,  shoes  and
fishing (Favaro  and Bension,  1993,  195); the investment  rate rose from 10%  to  19%.  The deficit remained
high, however,  due to increased spending on the military  and on public investment projects,  which offset
the fall in the areas  of wages and transfers.  Attempts to restrict monetary growth were offset by inflows
of cash,  especially from Argentina.
The initial trade reforms of 1974 were followed by a trade liberalization program that attempted to simplify
the tariff structure and gradually to reduce the level of protection to the target level of 35%.  The stages of
217the program  were announced  in  advance  to  rive the private  sector  a  better chance  to plan  effectively.
Implementation was begun in 1979;  with inflation soaring  the government  elected to reduce tariffs ahead
of schedule,  but by the time the 1982  crisis set in the push was derailed (Favaro and Bension,  1993,  281).
The trade liberalization,  intended to shift resources toward the tradables,  did not have this effect because
its  impact was  more  than offset  by the exchange  rate overvaluation  which was part  of the  stabilization
effort.
The policies pursued between  1979 and  1982 together with the overvaluation  of the Argentine currency
led to an increase in aggregate demand that induced a rise in both wages and employment.  Before the crash
appeared  in the second half of 1981  the investment ratio got as high as  18.7%  and  the export share  was
above  18%  (Favaro and Bension,  1993,  283).
The  1980 referendum  called by the military on constitutional  change was defeated by  a significant margin;
this event marked the first step toward the re-opening of the political system (Allen and Labadie,  1994,  14).
The macroeconomic  crisis became  increasingly evident as the pre-announced rate of devaluation (Tablita)
became unsustainable  and external public debt shot up from 9.2%  of GDP in  1982 to 40%  in 1985.  Unions
started to reappear as  it became  clear that the military wanted to hand the reins over to the civil society,
and the  new movement proved  at least as militant as  the old.  Wage  councils  were reinstituted  in  1985,
along with the return to democracy  (Allen and Labadie,  1994,  15).
A couple of years of fast recovery were once again followed by stagflation.  Though the budget  deficit was
down to 3.2%  of GDP in  1990, as of 1994 only the trains and buses had been privatized;  a bill for wider
privatization passed  congress but a petition led to a referendum  which killed it.  Williamson (1990)  cites
the lack of deregulation  in the  labour market,  where  firing  was  again almost  impossible,  payroll taxes
heavy and trade unions still strong, as a possible source  of the still sluggish growth performance.  Authors
like Allen and Labadie also suggest that the labour market institutions  are likely to render the labour market
less  efficient.  The evolution of income distribution in Uruguay is  less well  laid out than for most of the
other countries discussed here.  It seems clear that a net worsening has occurred  since the early  1960s,  but
neither the timing,  the degree  nor the characteristics of the worsening  are well understood.  The data for
the Montevideo  household distribution suggest a very large increase between the early  1960s  (Gini around
0.37) and  1984 (Gini  of 0.48).  The pattern is not at all  continuous however  (Table 6),  and some of the
early  1980s observations  have the appearance of outliers.  The average of the three figures for the period
1961-62  to  1967  is 0.385  while the average  for the three over  1980-84 is 0.441  for an  increase  of 5.6
points.  The reported inequality  of earned income  among Montevideo households  rose very  fast over the
1970s,  but  the  sources  consulted  have  no  observations  for  the  1980s.28  It  will  be  important  to  get
observations  for the period since  1985 when the unions were able to get back into the act.
The distribution pattern of the  1970s is of particular importance  because of the important policy changes
introduced at that time. Most of the evidence,  as noted,  points to a  substantial  increase in inequality,  and
this  is the  general  consensus  among  students  of the  issue.  The sharp  fall in wages during  that decade  is
28 If one believed  in the end point observations  for the Montevideo  distribution of total household income,  one
would conclude that the net increase over  1963-84 was at least  10 pointes.  If one also accepted the validity of the
figures  on the distribution of earned income among households  (it is not easy to accept both because of their
apparently  different patterns over time),  one would conclude  that inequality dipped sharply  in the 1980-82 period.
1980 was the last year of fast growth;  in 1982 output dropped sharply  in 1982 and was dramatically  lower again in
1984.
218consistent  with  it, 29  as  is  the  apparently  sharp  widening  in  the  earnings  differentials  across  people  of
different educational levels. Figures presented by Indart (1981,  reported in Favaro and Bension,  1993,  286)
show a tremendous  increase  between  1972  and  1979;  for  example,  the earnings  ratio  for persons  with
completed university to those with incomplete  primary rose from 2.1  (extremely  low,  by the standards  of
other countries,  making one wonder whether there is a data problem) to 5.6.30
Favaro and Bension (1993,  199)  suggest that the opening of the economy31  , the reduction in the relative
size of the government,  and the prohibition of labour union activity  all contributed  to increasing inequality.
They believe that the behavior  of the labour market during previous  decades was  greatly influenced both
by the unions  and by the state's participation in the wage boards,  in the determination of wage levelly and
as employer  of a significant share of the labour force. These factors,  they feel,  weighed in favor of a more
uniform wage structure than would have resulted from market forces,  created disincentives  for more skilled
workers  and led to considerable  emigration by this group.  This view,  expressed with different details,  is
29  The real  wage indexes calculated by the Direccion General de Estadistica  y Censos  (DGEC) and the Banco
Central  del Uruguay (BCU) show tremendous  declines (around 35-408) during  1970-7  (Favaro and Bension  (1993,
199).  The national accounts  showed a sharp drop in the (paid?) wage  share over  1974-78,  from 40.4%  to 31.7%
(ibid,  275). The authors  note that,  although the wage series point to immiserization of workers,  the  other indices
(infant mortality,  water supply,  etc) indicate improvements.
30 Allen and Labadie  (1994,  112) do not report the raw data they use, but their earnings  coefficients  for
Montevideo  suggest something between the two earlier estimates cited  above. Buchelli  (1992)  shows a ratio of 4.8
(monthly  income) for males with 4 or more years of tertiary education vs.  those with completed primary  and a
ratio of 7.8 for females,  very high by comparative  standards.  The male  figure is almost identical to the  1979
figure of Indart though we have not been able to find whether that source refers to both sexes or to males  alone; in
either case it appears that education-related  earnings differentials  may not have  changed  too much in the  1980s,
even after the return of unions  etc.  This is consistent with  Allen and Labadie's  reported earnings  function
coefficients for the  decade;  these  fall but not very sharply.
31  Though citing the opening of the economy as a possible  factor contributing to the increase  in income
differentials  during the  1970s,  Favaro and Bension (1993)  describe a scenario in which the  effect might be
expected to be the opposite.  "The changes  in relative prices  observed  after  1973 led to an expansion of export-
oriented activities,  which were relatively more labour intensive than  import-substituting  activities  and which made
more intensive  use of unskilled  laborers.  Export-oriented  firms were,  on average,  newer and smaller than firms
oriented toward the domestic market.  The power of unions and the role  of pre-existing wage  structures
as determinants  of absolute and relative wages  were thus less important  in these firms.  Thus,  the rapid expansion
of the economy  after  1973 produced  an uneven increase  in wages for different labour  categories because  of the
scarcities of different labour skills and their short-run  supply elasticities.  Highly  educated workers  benefited."  The
evidence presented is certainly  consistent with the last point.  But data reproduced by the authors (Table  12-8,
p.286) show that those employed in small firms (perhaps in fact plants?)  with fewer than 50 workers) had average
wages still just 65%  those of workers in large  ones (200 and up).  The average in export oriented sectors was 76%
that for import substitution sectors.  To  assess this interesting  argument,  some quantitative  evidence of the greater
labour intensity of the  export sectors  would be needed.  It appears unlikely  that the  trade opening would have had a
major impact on distribution. If it did, then such positive influences  as it had must have been overwhelmed by the
other ones, coming from changes  in the institutions governing the labour market, from the downsizing  of the
public sector or from other sources.
219also  held  by  Allen  and  Labadie.32  The Uruguayan  experience  is  widely  interpreted  as  one  in which,
whatever their impact on distribution,  labour market rigidities and  imperfections have been an important
drag on economic growth.
Mexico  and the Dominican Republic
Unlike  the  southern  Cone  countries  discussed  above,  Mexico  and  the  Dominican  Republic  did  not
undertake major policy reforms until the  1980s. In each case the crisis hit in the early  1980s.  The Mexican
experience  is much the more studied of the two,  and of special  importance given the country's  recent entry
into  NAFTA,  making  it the  first developing  country  to  enter a  free  trade  area  with  large  developed
countries.  Mexico may have an unusually  fast integration into this  larger external  economy.
Mexico grew rapidly during the 1970s  (second only  to Brazil),  but then ran afoul of its debt build-up and
achieved an average  growth of only about 2% since  1980, with the 1990s  performance  still in that range
in spite of the major policy  reforms of the late 1980s.  In contrast to Brazil, whose balance of payments was
negatively affected by the oil price hikes,  Mexico  eventually benefitted from the high price of oil, but by
the  latter  1970s was  attempting to maintain  a level of expenditures  inconsistent  with  its tax  effort,  and
turned to heavy foreign borrowing to mike up the difference.  The debt crisis brought  an output decline  of
about  8%,  a serious bout of inflation,  and  a  sharp decline  in  real wages  of about  30%  over  1982-86.
Students  of Mexico are currently waiting to see how the set of policy reforms  and the accession to NAFTA
will affect the country's performance.  The slow growth of the early  1990s has been associated  with the
large capital inflow and resulting overvaluation of the exchange  rate.
Mexico's industrial development  was nurtured in a rather typical import substitution policy regime  which
provided moderate levels of effective protection to manufacturing,  and which  included a number of sector
specific programmes  in infant industries  which gave  increasing  emphasis  to export targets  and  to price
competitiveness  (Ros,  1994,  208).  By 1980 the structure of industrial  production and  trade was radically
transformed  vis a vis a few decades earlier.  Policies were overhauled in the  1980s in response to the debt
crisis,  with liberalization  undertaken  in the  late  1980s.  Current  trends  in  the  trade pattern  and in  the
industrial structure are for the most part a continuation of past trends,  this  "smooth"  transition attributed
by some (e.g. Ros,  1994,  209) to a combination  of successful  import substitution in the past and the fact
that the debt crisis and declining  terms of trade forced  macroeconomic policy to provide unprecedented
levels of exchange  rate  protection which  facilitated  the adjustment  of industrial  firms  to  a  more  open
economy.
32  They suggest that narrowing of various differentials  since  1985 may be the result of the return of the wage
councils and unions to action after being suspended  during the years of military rule.  For Montevideo males,
returns to schooling  (the coefficient  of the Mincerian earnings  function fluctuated without trend over  1981-87  (the
range was  9.1-9.7),  then fell to the range 0.84-0.88  (Allen and Labadie,  1994,  112).  For females this coefficient
dropped in 1982 and rose over  1989-91.  The earnings  gap between Montevideo  and the interior gap from 44%  in
1981  to 28%  in  1988 before rising again to 398 in 1990.  The authors suggest  that all of these results  are consistent
with the greater role played by collective bargaining  after  1985,  but in fact it is hard to see any break  in the trends
at this time,  and would seem quite easy  to explain the compression of differentials by changes on the supply side.
Based on a regression model,  they  find real wages in all manufacturing  to be 7.7% higher in the first quarter
of 1985 in a model with a variety of other variables  (Allen and Labadie,  1994,  132).  An additional 3.68 increase
occurred in industries that became  fully unionized relative to those that stayed union-free possibly an
underestimate  of this effect.  How these wage effects  might impact on income distribution is,  however,  not clear.
220Over Mexico's  long period of rapid growth up to the debt crisis in the early  1980s  it  appears that most
wages rose substantially  (Gregory,  1986)  and that inequality either fell  (as argued by Hernandez-Laos  and
Cordoba (1982)  or stayed about constant.33 Alarcon and McKinley  (1994)  report that the Gini coefficient
of total household  income  (grouped data) rose from 0.43  in  1984 to 0.475 in 1992,  most of the increase
having occurred by  1989 (Table 7).34  35 The five point increase in the Gini coefficient of urban  inequality
over  1984-89 is comparable  to that in many of the other countries  discussed here,  for which typically the
data are limited to those areas or even to the capital  city. During this period the main shift in distribution
favored the top decide,  whose share in total household distribution rose from 32.8%  to 37.9%.  (Alarcon,
1994,  87).  This share presumably  rose more markedly in the urban  areas,  based on the greater overall
increase  in inequality there.36
The increased inequality among households has been significant but not out of line with that observed under
similar  circumstances  in  other countries  of the  region.  What  is unusual  about  the  Mercian case  is the
increased concentration among wage and salary earners; for this group the Gini coefficient rose moderately
from 0.419 in  1984 to 0.443 in 1989,  then leapt to 0.519 in 1992  (Table  8), probably one  of the highest
Gini coefficients  of wage  income observed anywhere.37 The variance  within virtually all groups  exploded
over  1989-92  (Alarcon and McKinley,  1994, Table 4),  but most especially  at higher levels of education,
in the border states, in export manufacturing  industries and,  surprisingly,  among union workers.  There was
an increase  in rural areas but it only made up for the decrease  over  1984-89,  so all of the  country-wide
increase over  1984-92 is accounted  for by the urban areas. By occupation there was no increase  in income
variance among "poor" workers (in domestic service,  helpers and unskilled laborers  in industry and  street
33  Because Mexico's  income distribution data have until recently been less complete  than those of most other
major countries of the  region,  it is not possible to trace the record back in time with a high degree of confidence.
Fortunately the household surveys  of 1984  and 1989  do provide  valuable and hopefully  fairly comparable  evidence
relating to the crisis  period and the first part of the adjustment process.
34  For households ranked by per capita household income (individual  data),  the increase  for  1984  to 1989,  from
0.488 to 0.519  (Table 7),  was a little  smaller than that just cited.
31  The evidence that the number of super-rich has increased  rapidly  in Mexico  (two Mexicans were
included  in Forbes magazine's  1991  list of billionaires, but the  1994 list included 24) may mean that
these data understate the increase  in inequality,  since household surveys  essentially never include
evidence  from that very  small group  of very rich families.  Only after more detailed analysis,  involving
a wider range of methodologies,  will the Mexican  story become  clearer.
36  As for the completeness  of reporting,  Lustig  and Mitchell's  (1994) comparison  of the  1984 and  1989  survey
suggest a considerable  improvement in income  reporting coverage  between the two years,  from 40%  in the former
to 55%  in the latter  (their Table  2).  The two survey's exported about the same  share of wage to total  income,
while  this share was substantially  lower in the national  accounts for  1989.  One wonders about the national
accounts  validity here.  Non-wage  income  is of different types and so overall  it is hard to judge whether the
apparent change in reporting would in fact have led to a upward bias in the  reported Gini trends.  This is clearly
possible, but hard to assess.  it sounds as if a look at the national accounts  may be needed  or at how these authors
did their calculations.
37  The Gini coefficient for urban wage earners leapt from 0.37 in 1984 to 0.41 in 1989  and up to 0.528 in  1992.
(I presume  that these figures refer to wages and not to other income and that the persons in the comparison are
those whose main  income is from wages.)
221vendors  or urban agricultural  workers (Alarcon and McKinley,  1994,  18);  at  the other  extreme,  in the
"elite"  occupations  (professionals,  mangers, supervisors,  etc) the Theil  L indexes more than doubled.38
In terms of many  of the known correlates  of wage  income,  differentials  actually  narrowed  over  1984-89
(Compositional  changes may have shifted things in the opposite direction),  while for the later period higher
education and elite occupations  saw considerable  relative  increase,  though in the latter case this less  than
offset the sharp  decline in the previous period.  The category most clearly achieving  a relative  gain over
the  two periods  was  the  people  with higher  education,39  but the  ratio  of 3.8  via  a vis  those with  no
education  (is  this  interpretation  correct?)  in  1992  is not  high  by  international  standards  (Alarcon  and
Mckinley,  1994,  Table 7).
Table 9 suggests that some of the increase in inequality between  1984 and  1989 did  come from widening
gaps in wages across traditional  segments of the market,  in particular between poorer states and others  and
between border states and the rest; the former  lost ground and the latter gained.  The  rural/urban gap also
increased markedly.  But several factors were working in the opposite direction, in particular the narrowing
gaps between union and nonunion workers  and between nontraded goods sectors and traded goods sectors.
There was,  however,  a sharp  decline  in the share of income in agriculture/livestock  and an increase  in
profits from industrial and commercial enterprises.
At least two puzzles need to be solved before the picture of wage  structure changes since the early  1980s
will be clear.  An independent source of evidence  (data from the annual  industrial  surveys) indicates that
the earnings gap between non-production and production workers in manufacturing  has been widening, but
it suggests an earlier turning point from a previous trend towards  narrowing to the present one--about  1985.
These  data show a long trend of declining relative  wages prior to the recent survey,  from nearly  3.0 in
1965  to a low of about  1.85  in 1985  and back up to close to 2.2 by  1988  (Fenestra and Hanson,  1994,
Figure 3).
Fenestra  and Hanson  also  make use of a special  SECOFI  sample  of  2354  plants,  where  they  find  an
increase in relative annual earnings of non-production to production workers  of 29%  over  1984- 90,  with
24 percentage  points occurring over 1987-90. 40
38 Note that these figures  are described  by the authors as not comparable  over time because their maximum value
varies with the log of average monthly wages (Alarcon and McKinley,  1994,  Table 6) but it seems  that the
standardized  Theil rises by about as much,  --see their Table 5. In any case the  relative variance can probably  be
read fairly well from this.
39  The sort of increase in wage variance observed in Mexico during  1989-92  suggests that human capital  as
traditionally measured has  much lower value now than before;  it explains  a considerable  smaller share of
variance,  though the implicit rates of return may not be lower since the gaps have widened.  It clearly  means that
among the people with higher education some are now doing astonishingly well;  it will be important to sort out
who these people are.
40  It is worth noting that both the household survey data and the industrial survey  data point to a dramatic
increase in wage differentials  within a three year period; the problem is the at for the former it is 1989-92 and for
the later 1987-90.  (We have not seen the industrial  survey  figures for 1991-91).  Assuming both sources do have a
story to tell, it will be important to find out why the increase was so concentrated  in a short period of time.
222The second puzzle involves the relationship between the distribution of earner income  and that of household
income. If we accept that income dispersion among paid workers increased  dramatically over  1984-92, and
especially  over 1989-92,  why has this not shown up in a larger increase  in the concentration of household
income?  More puzzling perhaps  is the fact that the pseudo-Ginis of wage  income among households  show
only a modest increase over  1989-92 and actually fall a little over  1984-89 (Table  7).41  on the other hand
the pseudo Gini for profits from industrial  and commercial enterprises  and from services  rose dramatically
over  1984-89,  fuelling  the overall increase  in household inequality  observed during that period,  a  story
similar  in kind though more striking in degree to that reported below from Colombia.  If all of the data are
reasonably accurate,  the implication appears to be that the sharp widening  of dispersion of wage  income
among earners  has been largely offset in the household distribution by the fact that a  considerable  share
of the individuals moving up in the earnings  hierarchy belong to families  which are  not high  in the family
distribution.  This important  question warrants  further probing. 42
The confusing  Mexican story lends itself to a variety of policy-relevant  interpretations.  Though the stresses
of the crisis  beginning  in  1982  were  severe,  and  though  certain  income  gaps  (e.g.  between poor  and
non-poor  states)  did  widen,  the  overall  increase  in  inequality  was  modest,  if we  trust the  household
distribution  data. But the sharp  widening of wage dispersion in the  1989-92 period,  and the evidence  of
widening  gaps between  more  and  less  skilled  workers  call  for  analysis.  Has  increased  openness  had
something  to  do with the latter  expansion?  Has the  declining  importance  of traditional  labour  market
institutions played a role? Where does technological  change come into the story?  Such a large and sudden
increase  in wage dispersion  would seem hard to explain by  something  like technological  change  alone,
although  it could be interacting with other factors.
Fenestra and Hanson suggest that the widening wage gap by skill may be due to the inflow of capital.  In
their  model  a  movement  of capital  from  the  North  to the  South  (or  more  generally  a  higher  rate  of
investment in the latter) lowers the relative wages of unskilled workers in both  countries.  (Whether they
will be  worse off in absolute  terms depends  also on the impact of the  capital movement  on the  relative
prices of goods to wage.)  The key idea  is that the activities transferred from the North to the South when
capital moves in that direction will be more skill-intensive  than the average  of those formerly found in the
South but less skill intensive than the average of those formerly  found in the North. Mexico's  FDI boom
of the late 19805  was large in relation to the  existing capital stock,  hence provides a  good laboratory test.
As predicted  in the theory, the relative wage  movement in Mexico parallels that observed of the  U.S.  In
Mexico  the increase  in the skilled/unskilled  wage ratio  was greatest in the border region (50%  for both
hourly and annual wages --Fenestra and Hanson,  1994  33).
Liberalization of trade (begun in 1985)  is considered complementary  with the foreign investment flow and
the authors do not try to disentangle the effects of the two phenomena.  They doubt that the relaxation  of
41  Whether judged by the  small change  (a decline)  in the log variance  of earnings  of wage workers  (Table 8) or
the constancy  in the pseudo-Gini  for wages  in the household  income  distribution (Table 7),  the wage structure
appears  not to have been behind that increase in overall inequality,  not even in the sense of the wage share having
fallen,  since according to this evidence  it did not
42 Should one,  given the very different stories being told here according to which distribution one looks at, look
into the mappings among distributions and consider using a distribution by adult equivalents?  (The next draft of
the Berry-Tenjo paper on Colombia will include results of such an exploration.)  Also it would be very
interesting to know what happened  to the  distribution by consumption.
223minimum wages,  begun in 1983,  was important in the widening gap.  The real product minimum wage fell
by 30.8% over  1984-90.  Bell (1994) finds no evidence of a negative  correlation between minimum wages
and employment,  suggesting that the minimum wage decline was not behind the fall in relative  wages  of
production workers.
At least two studies have addressed  the relationship  between trade liberalization  and employment  and/or
wages, using models involving regressions  estimated with pooled cross-section and time series information
(true?).  Feliciana (1993) finds no impact of liberalization on industry-level  employment.  Revenga (1994),
however, uses firm level data and obtains  a negative and significant coefficient for the  impact of the tariff
(or tariff  equivalent)  on  employment.  She  includes  a wage  rate  in  the  employment  equation,  unlike
Feliciana (1993).  The wage equation estimated  suggests that lowering tariffs raises real wages;  wages  of
non-production workers do not appear to be very responsive to changes  in protection levels whereas  those
of production workers do (Revenga,  1994,  18-19).  The author finds  this positive effect on wages puzzling,
and concludes that it may reflect changes in the composition of labour towards higher-skilled  workers.  This
line of study needs further work to verify that the equations  have been well  specified,  and that longer run
effects have been adequately  picked Up.  43 If the result holds up that employment effects are modest"  and
more especially that the average wage impact is positive (though she does not claim this strongly),  then one
may conclude that the main worrisome impact of liberalization  is that on income distribution.  It would be
interesting  to  "blow" her results up to a global  level to  see whether they might  account for much of the
worsening  which has taken place.
The Dominican Republic's  economy grew rapidly until  1977.  The external crisis hit in the early  1980s and
led to an adjustment program composed  of fiscal,  monetary and exchange rate  elements,  that continued
until 1986 by which time the adjustment had taken place and growth returned.  The new  1986 government
stimulated  the economy through  an ambitious  programme  of public  investment,  in pursuit  of which  it
shrunk real current expenditures,  contributing  to a fall in the real wages of government workers  (Sanatan
and Rather,  1993,  54).  Inflation broke loose  in this period, after relative  stability up until  1984.
Sanatan and Rather (1993,  55) report that after a small k decline in inequality  between  1976 and  1984--the
Gini apparently falling from 0.45 to 0.43,  there was a sharp jump to 0.51  in 1989.  The  authors blame the
inflation,  among  other things for the deterioration. 45
Colombia and Ecuador
Colombia, Ecuador,  and Peru are among the relatively  late-comers to the market-friendly  policy package,
both doing so  only  in the 1990s,  and  Colombia has the  distinction  of being perhaps  the only country  to
adopt the package  even though it was not under severe  pressure of circumstance  to do so. It is also special
43  Cross-section analysis is likely to miss some of the impacts of trade,  as suggested by the fact that Revenga's
results do not seem consistent with the  fact that there has been little change in the national ratio of non-production
to production workers though there are substantial changes  across regions  (Fenestra and Hanson 1994,  27).
4  The paper  finds that a 10 point reduction in tariff levels,  such as that experienced between  1985 and 1  '990 is
associated with a 2-3%  reduction of employment,  though for production workers the elasticity is 0.27 (18).
45  It would be important to have more recent data to see if the high Gini coefficient reported for 1989 was a blip.
224in that the distribution record of the previous  15 year period was a positive one.  With respect to the labour
market effects of the apertura and other policy reforms,  the evidence  is mixed,  and the period  involved is
in any case too short to provide definite answers,  though most of the effects of the gradual  liberalization
underway from the mid-1980s may already have been felt.  Though some industries have  clearly been hurt
by  the  import  liberalization,  urban  unemployment  has  remained  low  by  Colombian  standards.  Most
important,  however,  there appears  to have been a relatively  sharp reversal of the previous  equalizing trend
in the urban distribution of income. If the negative trends apparent through early 1993  (the most recent data
we have been able to incorporate here) were to continue for a few more years the accumulated  worsening
could become comparable  to extreme  cases like Chile  and Argentina. 46
Colombia's experience over the 1970s-1980s  appears to have been unique within the region,  since a  good
case  can be  made  that  income  distribution showed  some net  improvement,  while the  country  was  also
recording  one  of  the  few  good  growth  records  over  that  span.  Since  the  late  1960s  Colombia's
macroeconomic  performance  has  been among  the best  (or least bad)  in  Latin America.  Over  1970-93
average  GDP growth was 4.4%,  placing the country second only to Brazil at 5.1%  (Berry, Mendez  and
Tenjo,  1994,  Table 2.1).  Growth was also the least unstable among major countries in the region,  as the
debt crisis and the accompanying  recessions  hit Colombia much less hard than most other countries.  In the
early 1990s  (through  1994)  has been a little  above average  for the region, at about 3.5%  per year.  This
creditable  record  dates  from  the  late  1960s  and  has  been  based  on  generally  good  exchange  rate
management  since the switch to a flexible rate in 1967,  a trade regime offering incentives both for import
substitutes and for exports,  and a relatively prudent fiscal and monetary policy,  under which fiscal deficits
never reached the unsustainable levels of several other countries  of the region and monetary growth was
accordingly more modest.
The administration of Lleras Restrepo marked an important turning point for the economy.  The  1967 trade
and exchange rate reforms ushered  in one of the most successful  periods of industrial  and  export growth
in Colombia's history, and put an end to a liberalization  episode which had taken place  since  1965 under
severe pressures from the donor agencies  (Diaz-Alejandro,  1976,  Ch.7). The Lleras government refused
to  devalue  and  instead  adopted  the crawling  peg,  stringent  import  and exchange controls,  and  a  stable
export promotion policy (Ocampo,  1994,  136).  This process was  interrupted since the late  1970s by the
Dutch disease effects  of the coffee and foreign indebtedness  booms between  1975 and  1982,  reflected in
the real appreciation of the peso and a mini-episode  of import liberalization around  1980.  As industrial and
overall  growth slackened (hitting bottom in 1982-83  with little or no growth),  export coefficients declined
and structural change ceased.  Since the mid-1980s there has been renewed growth in the industrial sector,
but the presumably falling returns from the ISI elements of the model and the acute change  in the external
conditions  facing the country led to a radical turnabout in policy in 1990-91,  and the adoption of a more
explicitly outward-oriented  strategy (Ocampo,  1994,  145).  It is still too early to do more than guess at the
growth effects  of this strategy.
Protectionism,  though well embedded  in policies since the  19th century,  played a somewhat secondary  role
during  the first phase  of import  substitution,  while  real  exchange  rate  fluctuations  provided  the  most
important price signals  to industrial entrepreneurs  Ocampo,  1994,  134).  Ocampo sees the  1967 package
as the consolidation and  rationalization of the mixed strategy followed since the late  1950s.  In 1969 the
46  There has been growing concern in Colombia that the new "model" is  having an adverse  effect on income
distribution (Sarmiento,  1993).
225Andean Pact introduced ISI in a regional context,  but dissatisfaction with it spread in the early  19705  and
most  of its  mechanisms  proved  inoperative.  The Pastrana  administration  (1970-74)  was  not favorably
disposed to ISI and placed more emphasis  on export growth. Over the years a gradual import liberalization
occurred.  By the mid-1970s  inflation was a serious threat;  the Lopez government  (1974-78)  addressed  it
via tight monetary and fiscal policy,  which however was reversed  by the Turbay  administration  in favor
of expansionary  fiscal policy, tight monetary policy and  import liberalization,  leading  to  a consolidated
public  sector  deficit  of 7.1%  by  1982  and massive  public  sector  borrowing  abroad.  Real  appreciation
deepened  in the  early  1980s  debt boom  and  export promotion  was  downgraded,  not as  a result  of an
explicit  decision  but  of short-term  macroeconomic  considerations.  The  deteriorating  situation  led  the
Betancur administration  (1982-86)  to  rapidly reverse  more than a  decade  of import liberalization.  The
average  nominal tariff level was  raised from  32%  to 49%  between  1982  and  1984,  though  the average
collected  tariff did not rise until  1985,  and peaked at around 24%  between  1986-88  from the earlier level
of around  15%  (Berry and Tenjo,  1995,  Table  1).  As of  1991  it was back down to  13.3%,  a little below
the  1970s level.  The tariff equivalent of the QRs rose quickly over  1982-85  from  11%  to  31%,  though
falling back quickly  in the years to follow.  The liberalization during  the rest of the decade was moderate
(Ocampo,  1994).
During  the early  1980s,  thus, the  economy  had become  more  closed;  from a high  of 22%  in  1982  the
constant (1975) price import/GDP ratio fell to  14.4%  in 1984, then fluctuated in the  16-18%  range through
1991  (Berry  and  Tenjo,  1995,  Table  2).  The  comparable  current price  series  declined  and  rose  more
smoothly.  The time profile on the export side is similar; after the lows of 1982-83 of under  15%  (constant
prices) or 12.0 or less (current prices)  the recovery brought the shares to around  19%  over  1986-89.
The  two  principal  goals  of policy  in the  1980s  were  to  overcome  the  dangerous  fiscal  deficit  (which
reached  as high  as  7%  of GDP)  and  to overcome  the balance  of payments  deficit which led to  a rapid
decline of reserves  (Becerra et al,  1993,  106)- Industrial growth was slow and unstable during the decade.
By the  end of the  1980s,  slowing growth and accelerating  inflation were increasingly  interpreted  as the
result of a structural blockage based on two factors,  stagnation  in the growth of factor productivity and lack
of dynamism  in  investment,  frequently  blamed  in  turn  on  the  inward  looking  development  model
(Republica de Colombia,  1991,  7;  Montenegro,  1991,  cited by Lopez,  1994,  19).  This contributed  to a
perception that trade policy required  a radical change  towards  an explicitly outward oriented strategy,  a
perception that was consistent with a generally more market friendly ideology in Latin America  at this time.
The Gaviria administration  (1990-94)  came to power committed to continuing  and accelerating  the already
initiated process of liberalization,  which was accompanied  by a partial freeing of exchange controls,  more
open access  to foreign investment and a liberalization of the labour market.  It war aware that distributional
problems might result from the liberalization,  a concern derived both from  an understanding  of the sorts
of adjustments  which would be  involved  in the process  of "apertura"  and related  reforms,  and  from the
experience  of other countries of the region,  Europe  and elsewhere.
226The apertura was  carried  out quickly,  though its effects  on imports were delayed. 47 While  in December
1989,  38.8%  of tariff positions were free,  60.1  required previous permission,  and  1.1%  were prohibited;
by Nov.  1990 these numbers were 96.7,  3.3%  and 0. The long postponed liberalization  of intra-Andean
Pact trade  was accelerated  and  virtually completed  by  Jan.  1992,  and  the decision  was  made  to  put a
customs  union  in place  in  1992  with  tariffs  slightly  lower  than those  adopted  by  Colombia  in  1991
(Ocampo,  1994,  145).  The ratio of tariffs (including  surcharges)  collected  to GDP, around  1.5%  at the
beginning  of the decade,  fell to 1.1%  in 1984,  recovered to  1.7-1.9%  over  1985-88  (when a CIF tax on
imports was added to the customs and surtaxes),  fell to  1.0%  in 1992  but then rose to  1.3 % in  1993  as
imports surged. The average tax48 on imports of goods and non-factor services ranged between  10 and 14%
over most of the 1980s,  and fell only in  1992 and 1993 to the neighborhood  of 5%  (Berry and Tenjo,  1995,
Table 1).  Thus, though the import taxes did fall sharply  in 1992,  the decline is less than might be suggested
by the data on tariff positions.
The  crawl  of the peso  was  accelerated  to prepare  the  ground  for the  liberalization  and  some  external
funding was arranged in expectation of an import surge.  The import surge came much later than expected,
and foreign exchange reserves grew. The tight money policy pushed real  interest rates quite high and since
the government  opened the capital market at an early stage of the apertura this helped to flood the economy
with foreign exchange,  rendering the monetary policy unsuccessful.  With inflation accelerating  and imports
not growing,  and believing that the main factor in this situation was the expectation of further tariff cuts,
the government decided to accelerate the program,  dropping rates in 1991 to the levels previously planned
for 1994 (Becerra et al,  1993,  123).  After a further delay, imports finally jumped in  1992 (by 30%)  and
surged in  1993  (by over  50%).  The export quantum rose sharply  in  1990 (mainly  due to  coffee),  since
which time growth has been moderate.  The current price export/GDP ratio appears to have  levelled off at
around 20%.
Growth,  which had recovered to average 4.5%  over  1985-90,  fell to a low of under  2.5%  in 1991,  from
which it has gradually accelerated to somewhere in the range 4-5%  in 1993-94.  The fixed  investment ratio
(current prices) was quite stable at 17-18%  of GDP during the 1980s until it jumped in 1988 to 19.58,  since
which it fell systematically to  14.2%  in 1991,  recovering  to  15.5%  in  1993.  As noted above,  it is  fairly
generally accepted that income inequality decreased  in Colombia between the early 1970s  and the  1980s,
both in urban areas and for the nation as a whole,  and both for earners  and for households.49 An important
part  of the  story is  the unusually marked decline  in earnings  differentials  across educational  levels  and
between genders,  declines especially  concentrated  in the late 1970s  while the economy  was still growing
rapidly  and  in  the  early  1980s  when  it  was  not  (Tenjo,  1993).  Rural  earnings  were  also  showing
considerable  improvement at this time  (Ministerio de Agricultura y Departamento  Nacional de Planeacion,
47 There has been some difference of opinion with respect to how fast Colombia's wade liberalization has  taken
in comparison with those of other countries of the region.  Lora and  Steiner (1994)  conclude,  as does Edwards
(1994)  that it has been fast.  Edwards reports  that the  Chilean reform took about five years in the  1970s  while that
of Colombia took just one year after  being initiated in 1991.  Others,  like Sheahan (1994)  view the Colombian
liberalization as gradual,  from back in the mid-1980s.  Clearly  the issue is partly one of whether one focuses on
the tariff and QRs or on the Size of trade flows.
48 Excluding the value added taxes applied also to domestic goods.
49 Londoflo's detailed study suggests a decline in the Gini coefficient  between  1971 and  1978,  from 0.53 to 0.48,
with essentially no change from then until  1988,  for which his estimate is 0.475  (Londoflo.  1989).
2271990, 228).  Though some ambiguity remains as to the trends in the  1970s  due to data problems,  our main
concern here is with the period beginning in the late  1970s,  during which the economy  went through a brief
period of liberalization (early  1980s), then a sharp reduction in openness  followed by a gradual  re-opening
through the rest of the  1980s and the abrupt apertura of the early  1990s.  Labour market reforms occurred
mainly around  1990,  though union power was  clearly weakened by the recession of the early  1980s.
Our estimates  of income distribution in three  of Colombia's  largest  four  cities  (Bogota,  Medellin  and
Barranquilla)  reveal a quite significant and continuous50 decline in inequality between  1976 and  1990,  more
striking among earners (whose Gini coefficient fell from 0.50 to 0.41)  than among persons ranked  by per
capita  family  income  (where the  decline  was from  0.52 to  0.46--see  Table  10.5 . Among  earners,  the
relative  income  of the top to the bottom decile  fell from 28.6 fold to  18.8  fold.  The distribution  among
earners  is of interest because  it reflects  directly the way the  economy determines  the incomes  of factor
owners,  while the distribution among persons (a variant of the distribution among families)  is  of ultimate
concern since it is most revealing of the welfare distribution in the society. Inequality bottomed out in 1990
(our data refer to March)  after which it has increased  sharply,  especially  that among earners  (where the
Gini coefficient rose from 0.41  to 0.47),  but significantly also among persons (Gini up from 0.47 to 0.51).
Earner  inequality thus  returned to the  1980 level  (with the top decile  to bottom decide ratio back up to
27.3),  but remained below that of 1976,  while inequality among persona now exceeded that of 1980 and
was  close to the  1976 level,  reflected in a Gini coefficient  of 0.52.  In each case the largest deterioration
was that between  1990 and 1991.  Among earners the 1990-93  period saw significant declines in the income
share of the first six decides  (30.8% to 27.4%),  while the only major gainer was the top decile  (36.2%  to
40.4%--see  Berry  and Tenjo,  1995,  Table 4a).  In percentage  terms the biggest  losers  were the  lowest
deciles the first saw its share fall by 23 % from 1.93 % to  1.48%,  about the level of the late  1970s.  Among
persons,  all decides  lost except the top one, whose  share jumped from 37.3%  to 42.5%,  to nearly recover
the  1976 level (Berry and Tenjo,  1995,  Table 4b).  Percentage  share losses  at the bottom were less than in
the earner distribution,  with the first decile losing  17%,  from 1.75%  to  1.45%.  Most of the bottom deciles
still had a slightly higher share than in  1976,  as  reflected in the marginally  lower Gini than in that year.52
50o  Though the smoothness of the trends might disappear were all of the years to be included in the  series.
5  Since it is universally the case that capital incomes  are  less fully reported than labour incomes,  we presume
that our estimates  of inequality understate  the actual levels, probably  by a few percentage points  in the Gini
coefficients  (See Altimir,  1987,  for a discussion).  Our assumption and hope is that this and  other sources of errors
in the  estimates will not have changed much over time;  in one respect  where we feel this
assumption might not hold--related  to the introduction of the  "salario  integral"  around  1990--we  have undertaken
some sensitivity analysis to verify that it does not explain much of the observed increase in inequality since  1990.
Another possible bias could result from failure to take account  of differences  in the cost of living index relevant to
different income classes.
52 Other authors  have reported quite different trends in urban inequality from those presented here.  Thus the
series reproduced  in Table  10 shows  a pattern virtually the opposite of that reflected  in the  conceptually similar
Col (1),  in that the Gini coefficient rises through  1989,  after which it falls,  especially in 1992 (whose observation
does however correspond to a different month (June) than that for the other years (September).  (Another source,
presumably drawing on the estimates using this  methodology,  reports a decline in the urban Gini from 0.47 in
1988 to 0.44 in 1992  -- Banco de la Republica,  1994).  Although,  other things being equal,  one would attribute
greater meaning to the series covering the wider population base (those of Col.3 refer to the urban areas as a
whole) for a variety  of methodological  reasons we doubt the validity  of these estimates  and hence disregard them
in this discussion.  The differences  in methodologies  between these differing estimates probably explain  an
228It is interesting that the trends in level of concentration of each of the major components  of personal income
parallel those of total income (Table  11).  Note also that business income  has become more important over
time at the expense of labour  income.53 Since the latter is the most equally distributed  of the components
distinguished  here, its falling share of total income probably contributes  an upward push to the overall level
of inequality.  (Business  income is in the middle with respect to the Gini coefficient  while  "other" income,
which  includes  rental  income,  interest  income,  dividends,  pensions,  and  other  transfers  is  the  most
concentrated of the three.)  Business income  is most important in the lowest and the highest deciles,  while
labour  income is predominant in the middle of the distribution (Berry and Tenjo,  1995,  Table  6).  At lower
levels  of the distribution, however,  business  income probably reflects  income from informal activities,  and
to  the  extent that  these activities  use very  little capital,  it is mostly labour-based  income and  its  level  is
likely to be heavily influenced by the outcomes of the labour market.  More generally,  the very similar time
patterns of the distributions  of labour and of business  incomes  suggest close links between the markets in
which the two types of income  are determined.  The reversal of the former positive trend  in the level  of
inequality mainly reflects  the increasing concentration  of business  income.
Unfortunately,  Colombia does not have systematic national household surveys allowing .the sort of analysis
just carried out for urban areas to be undertaken  at the national level.  Rural data available for 1988  and
1992,  suggest little change  in inequality between those two years (the respective  Gini Coefficients being
0.46  and 0.45).  But a serious cause  for concern  is  the evidence that while  urban incomes  rose by  18%
between  1990 and 1993,  rural  incomes fell by at least 5%  over this period (Lora and  Herrera,  1994).  It
would be natural to interpret  such an outcome  as due in part to the production problems  of the agricultural
sector  in  1992  and  in  part to  the  price  impact  of the  apertura.  Together  with  the  sharply  increasing
inequality in the urban areas and the constant level in rural areas (at least  over 1988-92),  this widening gap
between the two distributions would suggest an even larger increase in inequality  at the  national  level than
for  the urban  areas;54 it also  suggests  that,  depending  on where  the poverty  line  is  drawn,  percent  of
population in poverty was probably increasing  over the early  1990s.
Although the available evidence  suggests that Colombia's  experience  seems to fall clearly  in the category
of those cases  in  which  distribution  was  improving  prior to  the  economic  reforms  and  then  worsened
significantly,  several caveats and additional twists are worth noting. First,  it is possible that the introduction
important part of the difference  in results  (Berry and Tenjo,  1995,  appendix).
53  Taking the figures literally,  the same could be said of "other"  income,  but as noted earlier, this  may be due to
a chanGe  in reporting procedures.  Since  it seems  safe to assume that some of the reported increase  is due to those
changes,  it would appear that the business component  has had a continuous  upward trend.
54 Another attempt to measure trends in distribution and poverty  at the national  level,  that of Fresneda  (1994,
Cuadro 5),  reports estimated  Gini coefficients  of 0.481  for 1978  and 0.472 for  1992  (distribution of households
ranked by per capita household  income);  a significant increase  in income shares for the bottom three deciles  (e.g.
4.2% to 5.4% for the bottom quintile) was offset by the increasing share of the top decide.  At the same  time he
reports that according to the income  measure of poverty,  the share of people  in that state fell only from 56.3 in
1978 to 53.5% in 1992 (and from 23.3 to 20.5% for the extreme  poverty line),  though according to the unsatisfied
basic needs criterion the  share fell from 70.5% in 1973  to 45.6% in  1985 and to 32.2% in  1993.
Although Fresneda does not present  comparable figures for intervening years,  if we assume that his figures,
like others,  show  an improvement over the late  1970s and early  1980s,  they are consistent with a sharp increase in
inequality  in the early  1990S for the country as  a whole.
229of the  Salario Integral,55 together  with  any  impact it has had on the correctly  measured  distribution of
income  and  other  labour  market  outcomes,  also  created  a bias  towards  the  observation  of increasing
inequality among labour incomes.  Some evidence is consistent with this hypothesis,  though as noted above,
what  dominated  the movements both in total monthly  income  and  in its concentration  was the  business
component  (Berry and  Tenjo,  1995).  Second,  it seems  likely that the use  of nominal price  measures  of
inequality understate  the increase since  1990  since it appear  that the relative prices  of luxury goods have
fallen with  respect  to  those  of necessities.  In his  analysis  Fresneda  (1994)  distinguishes  three  factors
affecting the trend in poverty incidence  over 1978- 92: an increase  in average per capita  income of 18.1%
which reduced the poverty incidence by 7.2 percentage points;  the small improvement  in (current price)
distribution which lowered  it by 0.4 points;  and an increase in the relative price  of the bundle of goods
purchased by the poor, which raised it by 4 points.  The last figure implies a faster  increase in the price of
the bundles of goods consumed by the poor relative to the rich over this period as  a whole;  it would not
be surprising if the  increase was  concentrated  in the period of "aperture".
Ecuador's experience with adjustment and liberalization is only now under serious study by C. Larrea.  His
initial findings  suggest that a sharp increase in urban inequality occurred between  1989 and 1991,  reflected
both in the distribution of income among recipients  and that among households.  In the latter case  the Gini
rose from an average  of 0.412 in 1988-89  to an average  of 0.461,  the share of the bottom decide fell from
2.15 % to 1.53 % while that of the top decile jumped  from 31.2%  to 34.9%  and that of the top  5%  from
20.35 % to 23.0%.  The country  embarked on import liberalization  in  1990 and imports boomed.
Costa Rica:  Reform  Without Widening Gaps?
Judging  by the evidence  available and reviewed  above,  Costa Rica may be the only LAC country  which
has  undertaken  the market-friendly  set of reforms  without  suffering  a  significant  widening  of income
differentials--say  an increase  in the Gini coefficient  of five percentage points or more.
Costa Rica  brought a tradition  of social  and political stability to the  trials of the  1980s,  and  came off a
strong post- war economic performance in which average GDP growth exceeded 6%  over 1950-80.  A good
social service system gave the country the highest life expectancy  in Latin America,  with the exception of
Cuba,  and the absence  of an  army  allowed  it to allocate more  resources to  civilian uses.  Growth  in the
1970s was fragile,  however,  based on an expansionary  monetary and fiscal policy,  a fortuitous  increase
in coffee  prices  in 1976-77 and  much  investment  financed  by foreign savings.  There  was  a continuous
expansion  of public  sector  employment  (Gindling  and  Berry,  1992).  The  second oil  price  hike,  rising
interest rates and the  world recession brought a sharp  14%  decline  in GDP over  1980-82,  a 23%  fall in
income per capita and a 25%  cut in real wages.  At the depths of the trough  a new president  with ties to
labour  and (through his party) to ( previous  social legislation took office,  buoyed by a high level of public
support and confidence.  Over the  next few years an adjustment program was put in place,  including tax
increases,  weakening  of the  power  of unions  (union  strength  had  lain  mainly  in  the  public  sector),
privatization,  and  new  incentives  for  exports,  especially  non-traditional  ones.  It  has  been  relatively
successful in reestablishing a decent growth performance,  about 4% per year (through  1992) after returning
to its pre-crisis GDP level in  1985- Policy changes were less extreme,  more gradual and less erratic than
in Chile.  In contrast to both those cases  (especially  Chile),  real  wages did not long  remain low,  as the
5s  The system by which a single payment replaces  the complex system of base wages and fringe benefits which
was in place before the labour market reform of late  1990 (see Berry and Tenjos  1995).
230indexing mechanism which linked nominal wage increases to past inflation was left in place with only mild
modification so that when tightened monetary and fiscal policy brought inflation quickly to heel real wages
moved back to or near their previous peak in only three or four years.
The national unemployment rate also returned quickly to its normal range,  around 5 %. Overall this must
tentatively be counted one of the more Successful  adjustment performances  in the region, in the sense of
reestablishing growth without a lengthy period of significantly higher poverty than before.
Although Costa Rica's distribution record is somewhat ambiguous  because of data problems,  it seems  likely
that it has not suffered a  significant worsening  of inequality  over  the period from before  the crisis  (late
1970s)  to  the  present.  The  data  (Table  13)  suggest  a  marked  worsening  of the  household  distribution
between  1985 and  1987 (over 4 percentage points  in the Gini coefficient)  at about the time that the export
push  begins  in  a  serious  way,  but  this  may  have  been  due  to  the  change  in  the  sample  and  the
questionnaire--an  issue obviously requiring further analysis.
Income  distribution  in Costa Rica has traditionally  been unequal,  but substantially  less  so than  in such
extreme  cases as Brazil.  Estimates of the Gini coefficient  of household  income (with households  ranked
by income,  not per capita income) have typically fallen in the range  0.43-0.50.  Trejos compares  1971  and
1983 data,56 reporting that the Gini coefficient  rose from 0.44 to 0.47, including  increases  in both urban
and rural region.57 If a worsening did occur,58 we do not know from this comparison whether  it was during
the  1970s or during the crisis of the early 1980s.  The only reasonably comparable  household distribution
estimates from just before and after the crisis (which set in 1980) refer to the labour incomes  of families
headed by paid workers;  in  1979 the Gini coefficient  for this group was 0.45,  in  1982 0.42 (Table  13).
Most of the bottom  decides  showed  significant  gains  in their income  share,  with  the exception  of the
lowest.59 The sharp drop in real wages in the formal and public sectors would be expected to lower labour
income most sharply for the decides near the top of the distribution, consistent with the significant  share
declines for deciles eight and nine over 1979-82.  As those incomes rebound in later years the shares move
56  Most earlier  estimates are insufficiently  comparable with;  those of 1983  to provide  much of a clue  as to
trends;  Trejos chose #  1971 to maximize such comparability.
57  CEPAL  (1987)  reports a Gini coefficient of 0.43  for 1971,  citing  Cespedes,  1973,  the  same source  cited by
Trejos and Elizalde (1986).  Trejos and Elizalde  (1986,  89-90) highlight  the markedly higher share of the top
decile (overall, but especially in urban areas--37.1%  to 32.9%)  and the widening gap between it and the 2nd
decile.  But the top decile had dropped back again by  1986 to near its  1971  share.
58 The difference between 0.43 and 0.45 is small, and may overstate  the true increase  in inequality  since income
coverage may have been less in  1971 than in 1983.
For  1971,  CEPAL (1987b,  Cuadro 4) notes that the  income reported in the survey  was 21.3%  below the
corresponding national  accounts  figure,  16.5% below disposable  income and  14.1%  below consumption.  In 1983
the income  reported was _____ below disposable income and 2.4% above  consumption.  This differential  in
reporting,  which usually involves weaker reporting of capital incomes,  could explain  a 1 or 2 percentage  point
difference  in the Gini Coefficient.
9  Severe  under-coverage  of income in  1982 is explained by  CEPAL as being due to the  accelerated inflation of
that year (nearly 100%  vis-a-vis  1981).  So this source may be creditable  in spite of the high figure.
231back up again.  The behavior  of the share of the bottom defile or so is not clear.  The  1977 survey  showed
lower shares than earlier or later ones but it remains to be seen whether this was due to data inadequacies. 60
As  for  the  post crisis period,  the  recent  study by  Trejos and  sauna  (1994)  provides  the  most  reliable
evidence,  though like all sources  it suffers  the uncertainties  due  to a change  of data collection  practice
between  1986 and  1987,61  doubly unfortunate since the process of economic  liberalization was just getting
underway at that time.  To achieve the maximum of data comparability  over the period  since 1980,  these
authors decide to use the household surveys,  and to limit the analysis to primary monetary income in wages
and business income of the self-employed 62  (Trejos and Sauna,  1994,  1)63  These  authors date the crisis  as
1980-82, the period of stabilization with some moves towards  adjustment as  1982-86,  and the adjustment
period as post-1986.  They report that inequality fell during the crisis,  both overall  and in urban areas,  and
suggest that it may reflect the relative  success of the minimum wage policy designed to protect those with
60  Altimir (1984) reports  a decline in the Gini coefficient of wage and salary  income of paid worker households
(households  ranked by per capita income)  from 0.376 to 0.346 between July  1979 and June  1982  with significant
share increases  for each of the bottom deciles--from  2.0 to 2.6 for the lowest deciles.
61 Both the Household Survey design and the  staff carrying  out the survey  and its processing changed between
1986 and  1987.
62  Though the authors refer to independent workers  in this context,  it appears that in fact they mean the
self-employed,  since data are presented for employers  in their Cuadro  2 and the rest of the discussion seems  to
suggest  this.
63  The income concepts  reported have become more complete over the years.  Transfers were included  in the
survey  from 1987 and capital income from  1991.  Income in kind is included  in the Surveys  but not computed by
Trejos and Sauma for paid workers,  though it is partially included in the  case of business  income since  1987.
To improve  comparability over time the authors work with a subset of 90-92%  of the families  in the
survey,  those with an employed or unemployed head and if non-participant,  having positive primary income.  At
first glance it would appear that the exclusions might affect distribution  a lot,  since capital  incomes are not
included.  But those incomes are presumably very badly reported in any case.  There  is  also a problem  of
increasing non-reporting,  rising from 4% of the employed in 1980 to 17%  in 1993,  and for families from 2%  to
20%  (Trejos and  Sauna,  1994,  Cuadro  2). It all happens between  1980  and  1985  after which these ratios  fluctuate
around the high levels  cited. For the self-employed  and employers the rates  are very high, for thee latter 30-40%
for most years since  1985.  All figures  were much lower before that.  This problem was  confronted by using
imputations based presumably (not quite explicit here) on an earnings  function.  Some additional  sensitivity
analysis might be worth while in this context,  since otherwise the  estimated trends over  1980-87  could be suspect.
(Gindling-Berry  found that the share of employees  not reporting  incomes rose from a range  of about
2%-5%  over  1976-79 to 15-30%  over  1981-86 before falling to under  10%  in 1987-88.  Their analysis of the
characteristics  of these non-reporting employees  does not suggest a higher degree of non-randomness,  but one
cannot demonstrate  that the trends in inequality were unaffected  by fluctuations  in the share who did not report.
Incomes from second jobs seem  to be very ill reported,  so a valid series  on household  income  distribution might
look rather different from anything  shown in the table A used here.)
The survey data were adjusted to that of the population  censuses with appropriate factors,  in order to
compare reporting  coverage with that of the national accounts.  This confrontation suggests variable coverage,
increasing considerably  in all categories over  1980-87,  then falling in each category  and for overall primary
income (Trejos and Sauna,  1994,  Cuadro 3).
The authors describe  an adjustment to 81%  of the national accounts primary income figures,  to allow for
capital income  of corporations,  etc.
232low  incomes.  Some  further  improvement  in distribution  took place  through  1985,  followed  by the big
increase in measured inequality  over  1985-87, which could however  relate  to the change  in methodology
of data collection.  Alternatively  it could reflect the first effects of the aperture.  After  1987  the tendency
of inequality is down.
With  Gini's  usually  in the  range  0.35-0.40,  the  distribution  of income  among  earners  appears  to  be
substantially less unequal than that among households  when all sources  of income are  included in the latter
estimates;  problems of comparability  are probably  also somewhat  less severe.  Figures  from CEPAL'  8
(1987b)  review  of distribution data  suggest little  change  over  1976-80  for  the  distribution among  paid
workers,  possibly  a mild worsening  over  1980-1982,  and then a rather marked improvement  in the next
two years.  Our estimates of distribution among workers  (paid or unpaid) (Table  13) reveal the same pattern
through 1986,  whose Gini coefficient of 0.36 is below the pre-crisis  figures,  followed by the same sort of
abrupt worsening  in  1987 as characterizes  the household  estimates. 64
As  for the  period  of macroeconomic  crisis,  the  earner data  indicate  some  worsening,  while the  more
problematic household data suggest the opposite.  The marked increase in non household heads as  a share
of employed workers would by itself produce some worsening  in the earner  distribution, but might in fact
improve  household distribution.
Given its importance  as a possible exception to the pattern of increasing inequality  in Latin America,  Costa
Rica's distributional history warrants further scrutiny and analysis in an attempt to overcome the problems
of data non-comparability.  The statistical regime change between  1986 and  1987 could have produced the
observed worsening at that time;  further,  the combination of the high and varying share of families  not
reporting incomes  and the need to focus only on primary labour and business  incomes in order to achieve
a.  modicum of comparability  over the  1980s leaves open the possibility  that the  real distribution trend was
substantially different from that estimated by Trejos and Sauna,  the most definitive study available  at this
time.65
These qualifications  notwithstanding,  the best guess  at  this time is  that there was no  significant,  lasting
impact of the post-1986  reforms on the level of inequality in Costa Rica.  Trejos and sauna  report Ginis of
essentially the same magnitude in 1993  as in  1980 (Table  13).  The nearly three percentage point decline
between  1980 and 1985  is balanced by the four point increase over  1985-87.  Since there is some likelihood
that the latter increase  is illusory, there is a corresponding  possibility that this Gini (i.e. the Gini reflecting
these families and the types of income included)  actually fell between  1980 and  1993,  and that it was about
constant between  1985  and  1993.66  The Gindling-Berry  estimates  of Ginis for the earnings  data show a
more abrupt increase between  1986 and  1987, but they too show  only a small net increase between  1980
an:  1988.  While  not  impossible,  it therefore  seems  unlikely  that  a  correctly  measured  distribution  of
"  In both  1987 and 1988 the share of the bottom decile is very low (1.5%)  and that of the top deciles higher  (at
around 34%)  than for year since  1975.
65  One hint that this may be the case  comes from the fact that the estimated Ginis using the set of families and
the forms of income they used are much lower than most other estimates of household inequality.
66 Note that these Gini coefficients  are close to those of Colombia for wage income, but assuming that a
significant amount of business income  is indeed included in the Costa Rica data (Trejos and  Sauna do not show the
distribution of households by activity of head) than the latter is considerably less.
233household  income would show  an increase of,  say,  five percentage  points from the pre-reform period or
perhaps the pre-crisis period and the post-reform  period.  If this is  the case,  Costa Rica  stands as  the sole
exception to the otherwise universal tendency  for such reforms to be associated  with increased  inequality
of that magnitude.
What might lie behind this unusual record?  Gindling and Robbins  (1994a) throw  some interesting  light on
this question,  at least in the context of the earnings  distribution among individuals.  Their various measures
of salary and wage inequality  show a steep fall between  1976 and  1980,  an increase during  the recession,
a fall in the recovery of 1982-85,  then a more gradual fall from 1987 to  1993.67 In the problematic  period
1985-87 there was  a very sharp  increase. If that increase were accepted  as real, the variance  of monthly
salaries over the whole period 1976-93  would have declined  slightly; the variance of wage  earnings, which
in any case increased much less during  1985-87,  shows a clear and very marked decline.
Gindling  and  Robbins  decompose  the  observed  changes  in  earnings  inequality  into  those  related  to
observables  (i.e.  to  the  distribution  of observable  determinants  of incomes,  including  education  and
experience),  changes in the prices of those Observable and changes  in non-observables.  Over the period
as a whole the observable quantities component  showed an upward trend,  i.e. its effect was to  increase
overall inequality within each of the two categories  of workers.  For salaried workers the price effect shows
a downward trend, not interrupted in  1985-87,  which seems to level off from  1988  but resume again  in
1992 and  1993 (Gindling and Robbins (1994a,  Figure 2). The time profile of the coefficients  of education
and experience  are similar to those for inequality--a  sharp reduction over  1976-80,  fluctuations,  and then
downward  but more  slowly from  1987  (Gindling  and  Robbins,  1994a,  25).  The  increase  in university
enrolment over 1970-80 was dramatic, that between  1985 and  1990 considerably  smaller.  The deceleration
(or termination)  of the  fall of returns  to education  may  also be due  to  changes  in the pattern  of labour
demand.  After  1985  little reduction  in  inequality  occurred,  though  the  increase  in relative  supply  did
continue,  suggesting that  "demand may have  become skill-based after  1985,  coincident with the gradual
implementation of trade liberalization policies in the form of devaluations  and reduction of tariffs'  (Robbins
and Gindling,  1994a,  7)
One broad interpretation  of the Costa Rica story  is that  it shares many features  of those for  other LAC
countries but differs  in degree.  For example,  while the earnings  differentials by skills does cease to fall
measurably,  it does  not increase  sharply  as  in  the case  of Chile.68  And  though  the  variance  of salary
incomes rose for a couple  of years after liberalization began,  it then continued its  downward movement.
67 Results are presented only for salaried workers,  but the authors undertook the same  analysis  including the
self-employed and note that the results  were  similar (Gindling and Robbins,  1994a,  12).
68  Note that,  after the possible spurious  increase  between  1985 and  1987,  the log variance of salaries  continues  to
rise between  1987 and 1989  (that of wages  does not). If this increase  reflected the sort of "stretching out" of
variance among higher earning white collar workers  which has been observed in other countries of the region in
the wake of economic  reforms, the striking thing here  is that it lasted only a couple  of years and was fairly
quickly reversed.
Note however  that the pattern emerging in Table 1 of Robbins  and Gindling  (1994b)  shows a recent
widening involving only university,  not secondary-trained  people.  If true, this seems very consistent with the
Chilean story. But with all university lumped together (incomplete and complete) it could also be an artificial
product of the fact that average years of university  (for those with at least some) was rising.
234Other countries:  Peru,  Brazil,  and Venezuela
A number  of country  experiences  have not been reviewed  in the  above  discussion,  either  because  the
statistical  evidence  on their income distribution trends is weak,  or because their particular history  is less
revealing of the relationship between  economic reforms and distribution.  It is nonetheless worth looking
quickly  at the evidence  with respect to their patterns  of distributional  change.
Peru,  always one of the poorest countries  in Latin America,  had followed an export-led growth  strategy
until the late 1950s,  and had been one of the slower growing  countries of the region. It then moved to an
ISI  approach,  using levels of protection for manufacturing  activities  which were high even by regional
standards  (Paredes,  1994,  217).  Initially  this approach  led to  high  rates  of both industrial  and  overall
growth,  but  the  increasingly  protectionist  steps  of the  late  1960s  and  early  1970s  introduced  strong
anti-export  and anti-agricultural  sector biases.  Compounded by a sharp deterioration  of the terms of trade
and serious  macroeconomic  mismanagement,  this led to stagnation and  then a plummeting  of economic
activity,  and  produced  a strong  political  consensus  that  the  country  needed  to  liberalize  its  economy
(Paredes,  1994,  217).
Given the small  size of this country and its market, and the fact that the easy ISI industries had expanded
to their limits by the mid-1970s,  a greater recourse to exports was the only logical outlet. But the country
did not pursue this objective  in an organized  fashion; the export booms and the episodes of active export
promotion  have,  rather,  been short-term policy responses  to balance of payments  crises.  Manufactured
exports, most with a high natural resource content,  showed promise when they enjoyed a boom between
the mid-1970s and  1980,  rising quickly  from 4%  to about 20%  of output  (Paredes,  1994,  234).  But by
1988  that share  was back  to  8%,  due  substantially  to Peru's  failure  to  devalue  in  a  way  sufficient  to
maintain competitiveness.  The real exchange  rate was  also highly variable  during this period.
In their efforts to confront the country's economic problems and challenges,  Peruvian governments have
oscillated  between forceful  state intervention  and  reliance on the market,  with disastrous  economic  and
political consequences.  The well meaning Velasco military  government  (1968-75)  continued the traditional
discrimination against food agriculture and was seriously  inadequate in policy management  and execution.
The liberal policies of  1981-82 had a dramatic  impact on industry.  The  Garcia administration was  noted
for  its lack of realism.  Among  the many stabilization and liberalization  programs  in Latin America,  the
Peruvian  version  (beginning  in  1990)  has been  the  most extreme  (Sheahan,  1993).  Results  have  been
mixed.  Adoption of a floating  exchange  rate and the elimination of controls on capital movements  under
conditions of tight liquidity appreciated the currency,  blocking  exports  and stimulating  imports.
Peru has thus registered  one of the poorest  growth performances  among  Latin countries,  combining  a
mediocre record in the 1970s with a disastrous  one since then. Although it is not clear whether distribution
has changed significantly  (for want of conveniently  comparable data at different points of time69), the real
incomes of workers  have suffered  more than in any other major  country,  and these  started  at a low level
to begin with.  As one of the category of recent (1990s)  reformers,  it  is not surprising that Peru's recent
distribution  record is  too hazy for anything to be drawn from it at this time.
69  For a useful recent review of the distribution evidence  see Rodriguez,  1994.
235Brazil's macroeconomic  story involves  the well-known  history  of deficit  finance  and  inflation,  and  the
heavy borrowing  during the 1980s which set the stage for this country's debt crisis.  On the trade side the
heyday of classical ISI lasted only until the mid-1960s  (Fritsch and Franco,  1994,  105)  and was marked
by  a dramatic  decline  in the  import  ratio,  related  both  to  the  size  and  potential  self-sufficiency  of the
country and to policy.  The second period, which  lasted until the  first oil shock, was  Characterized  by a
slow import liberalization,  decisive export promotion and a stable  real exchange  rate,  with the result that
both import and export propensities  underwent noticeable  recoveries.  In the third (ongoing) period  there
has been a return to import-repressive  policies,  but accompanied by the reinforcement  of export promotion
instruments.  Broadly speaking, the policy regime has been mixed,  somewhat like Colombia's until  1990.
Brazil has not, as of this time, embarked on the major set of reforms recently implemented  in Colombia.
Brazil's fast growth of the pre-1980 period was not capital-  saving and relied on a high investment  rate to
fund  some  of the  more  capital  intensive  industries.  During  the  19708,  the  increased  oil-import  bill
contributed to a need for foreign exchange.  Brazil's subsequent borrowing  was not unreasonable  given the
low cost of capital  at the time and the feasibility  of the plans for its use, though the country  did not help
its fiscal situation or the balance by payments  by keeping the price of oil and substitutes  well below the
world level.
Brazil's current stabilization program is very recent 1994) and although important structural reforms have
been undertaken--  tariffs often over 100%  in the late  1980s have been cut to a maximum of 35%  and an
average  of just 14%  and the restrictions  on foreign investment  greatly reduced--the  whole process is  too
new to have generated evidence on the possible  impact of economic  policy reform.  The country  eschewed
major policy reforms during the  1980s although its economic performance  was very  erratic. Between  1980
and 1983 per capita income  fell by about  15 %, after which it recovered fairly  strongly through  '986,  then
slipped again;  there were bouts of extreme inflation a;_ a major heterodox attempt to bring it under control.
Income distribution,  which worsened  somewhat between  1960 and  1970, has  shown no trend since then.
Through  1987 the  reported  Gini  coefficient for the distribution of income  among  Brazilian households
(ranked by total  household income)  never  moved  outside the  range 0.584-0.597  while the  share  of the
bottom 50% of the population fluctuated within the range 12.2-12.9% (Hoffmann,  1989a and 1989b).  Since
then the indicators of inequality have been somewhat  less stable,  but no net change has been registered.7 0
Some social  indicators continued to advance during the 1980s,  albeit less rapidly than before. World Bank
data on life expectancy,  infant mortality, food production  per capita and the share of the population with
access to electricity all show improvements between  1980 and 1987,  whereas the share with access  to safe
water fell.  Some improvements  may be the result of past investments;  low levels of current investment  will
take their toll in the future.
Brazil's growth performance during the 1980s was comparable to Colombia's, and the level of development
not far from Colombians (per capita income somewhat  higher but most social indicators about the same),
leading one to ask why that country  did not see the narrowing  of earnings  differentials  and accompanying
improvements  in income  distribution observed  in Colombia.  One hypothesis  is that the high prominence
70 Fluctuations  in the measured Gini coefficient have been associated with the rate of inflation and the real
exchange rates and the Gini did reach historically high levels around  1990-91 but has since returned to the normal
range (see the data presented in Cardoso,  1993).
236of the public  sector contributed to keeping up the wages of high income  occupations.7  Another  is that the
capital intensive character  of industrialization played a role.
Per capita income rose rapidly in Venezuela  during the  1970s due to the terms of trade shift as oil prices
jumped up;  though GNP per capita rose by just 11 % (or  1% per year),  gross national  income per capita
increased  at 3.4 % per year and per capita consumption jumped by 68%  (5.3 % per year).  Between  1980
and  1983,  GNP fell by 10%  but gross national income by a much sharper 21%  and  gross national  income
per capita by 28 %, the steepest decline of any country in the region.  Despite very  limited growth through
1986,  per capita  consumption remained  36%  above  the  1970  level.  One special  feature  of Venezuela's
1980s problems  was thus the very sharp decline from earlier high  levels of income  and  consumption.72
Another was an economic  structure which makes balance of payments  adjustment particularly difficulty. 73
The  fall  in oil prices  in  1986  deepened  the crisis  but the  government,  elected  in  1983  and  facing  the
electorate again in 1988,  opted against prudent economic policy in favor of budget and trade deficits.  By
1989 the economy was in crisis  and the government announced a radical  economic reform, supported  by
the International Financial Institutions (The world Bank and the International  Monetary Fund).  Effects were
quick--both fiscal  and trade equilibria  were brought to heel, though GDP fell by 8%  in  1989 and inflation
reached  81%  that year before  ceding  in  1990.  The  urban riots of February,  1989  were  followed by an
ambitious package of social policy measures.  Higher oil prices in 1990 (due to the Iraqi invasion) took care
of the balance  of payments and allowed a resumption of growth.  In 1991  an ambitious  expansion program
in oil generated strong growth than continued into  1992,  and Venezuela  was coming to be viewed a  case
of  successful  adjustment  under  democratic  government  and  the  darling  of the  international  financial
organizations.  But macroeconomic imbalances,  helped along by a 30%  fall in the terms of trade since  1990,
brought the expansion to a halt and led to another  cumulative  fall in output  (of 8-9%)  in  1993 and  1994
(ECLAC,  1994b,  39).
Household income  data, available on a systematic basis since 376 and reporting on monetary income  from
labour  and self- employment  (CEPAL,  1988,  12) suggest a lower level  of inequality than in most other
Latin American countries.  The Gini coefficient of household income  has varied within the range 0.39-0.44,
and the share of the bottom decile of families  from 1.55  to 2.0%.  There was  a gradual  decrease  in all the
household  inequality  indicators  over  1976-81,  in which the Gini  coefficient,  for example,  fell from 0.44
to 0.39. In the year of the greatest economic  decline,  1983,  the Gini stood at its lowest level,  0.39.  It then
rose to 0.43 by early  1985,  as per capita  income eased down a little further,  but by late  1987 it was back
at about the same level  as in the early  1980s.  Overall the picture was  one of striking stability.
1  A hypothesis  communicated  to me by Ricardo  Paes de  Barros.
72  Poverty  has unequivocally  increased  in Venezuela  to the  Point where it now affects  a third of the population.
7 Morley  (1994,  45) notes that this is a country  in which the poor are likely  to be hurt by devaluations  in their
role as  consumers but not helped in their role as producers.  The output of the major export is unlikely to be
influenced by the exchange rate (being mainly determined by quota) and the price of imported food is pushed up
by devaluation;  its relative price rose very sharply,  by 89%,  over  1980-89.  Adjustment to balance  of payments
deficits are likely to be long,  "require extended periods of recession, and venerate bitter disputes over real wage
reductions."
237Marquez  et al (1993,  151  and Table 5.2) report a worsening of distribution between  1981 and  1990, raising
the possibility that it occurred just at the end of the decade,  and may have been related  (to  either to the
recession  of  1989,  to  the  adjustment,  or to  the  liberalization.  The  estimated  Gini  coefficient  of total
household  income  rose from 0.398 in  1981  to  0.418 in  1990, but the more  relevant  Gini of "per capita
income  of members of the household--  rose  from 0.397 to  0.444.
74  Anomalies  in the figures  presented
detract from the confidence  which can be placed  in these figures.75
Lessons,  Challenges,  Implications and Questions
Such confidence  as  old school  Latin American  leaders had in the future  of their  countries  a couple  of
decades ago  evaporated in the trauma of the debt crisis and its painful aftermaths.  Though the  record of
growth and poverty reduction  over 1950-1980 was  a strong one, much ground was then lost in the next
decade and poverty  indices have increased seriously.  Now the countries of the region are launched  in a
different,  more outward-oriented  and less  interventionist  economic  model,  which  shows  clear signs  of
working well in some countries but has been slower than might have been hoped in allowing the region to
recover  its former growth;  ECLAC's 1994  estimate of GDP expansion for the region is 3.7%  (ECLAC
1994b,  38).  Unless growth accelerates  quickly in the next few years, and in some countries even if it does,
it will once again be overoptimistic to assume that growth will prove an adequate antidote to poverty.  The
reasons are Summarized  below.
1.  Distribution  has worsened significantly, if not dramatically,  in most countries undertaking market-
friendly economic reforms.
Slower than expected  growth  is  one  source  of dampened  hopes.  But the  main one  is  the  accumulated
evidence,  reviewed  above,  that  the  economic  reforms  have  been systematically  associated  with  severe
accentuation  of (primary)  income  inequality;  in the  LAC  region  the  only  probable  exception  to  this
generalization  is Costa Rica.  Insufficient data are available  to judge whether the distribution of secondary
of income (after  allowing for taxes, transfers,  public provision of goods) has moved differently from the
primary distribution or not. Effective targeting has made a positive  impact in some cases, but the reduction
of government  activity may have had a  regressive effect,  as  may the changes  in tax  systems toward the
greater use of indirect taxes.  This question deserves much more study than it has thus far received.
The  country  experiences  reviewed  above  suggest  that  the  "normal"  observed  increase  in  inequality
accompanying  reforms  is 5-10 percentage  points as measured by the Gini coefficient of primary income
(Table  14).  Though published evidence  detailed enough to permit such comparisons  is available on only
a subset of the countries,  it seems likely that this increase  is typically the result of a jump in the share of
the top decile,  most of this accruing to the top 5 % or perhaps  to the top  18 (as  in the cases of Colombia
74  The authors  also effect a classification  of the households into  four socio-economic  groups,  reporting  that
between  1981 and  1990 the lower class group  lost 1% of GDP, the lower middle lost 4.4%,  upper middle 0.6%
and the upper gained 5.9%.
7s  While the text seems to reflect understanding of the possible differences between the two  and the fact that
families  will be differently ranked (Marquez et al,  1993,  147),  it is not explained why the  1981  indicators are the
same for both ( this clearly suggests that something is wrong),  nor whether the unit in the second case is the
person or the family. In the second figures the increase over  1981-89 is sharp with some recovery  in 1990.
238and Ecuador households)  while most of the bottom  deciles  lose.76 In the three Colombian  cities analyzed
by Berry and Tenjo,  the ratio of the income of the top  5 % of households  to the bottom decide rose  from
13  fold to 20 fold.  The share of the bottom decile  (the biggest loser in percentage terms) fell from  1.75%
to  1.45 % of total recorded  income.  At a moderate  GDP per capita  growth  rate  of 2%  per year,  it will
require nearly  10 years of distribution neutral growth to recover the  "lost ground"  implicit in this  income
share decline.  If per capita income  growth could be accelerated  to,  say,  5%,  the recovery period  would
be only four years. In Ecuador,  where the percentage decline for the bottom decile was sharper  (from 2.2%
to  1.5 %),  nearly 20 years of distribution-neutral  growth at 2 % per year per capita would be needed and
about eight years at 5%.  It must be remembered  that these estimates  are imprecise,  and probably  include
some biases towards an overestimate  of the  increase in inequality and some in the opposite direction.  If the
true figures were  one-half of those reported here, the overall importance  of rising inequality would not be
too worrisome, as long  as one could be reasonable confident  of good growth performances  in the coming
years.  If the true increases are twice those  reported here  (also possible),  then the phenomenon  would be
of threatening proportions.
Although no one would argue that the typical Latin pattern of economic  expansion with extreme  inequality
is anywhere  close to  ideal, growth of that sort is certainly  better than no growth at all when  it comes  to
poverty alleviation. Hopefully more equitable growth can be achieved at some point in the future:  indeed,
some evidence  suggests that a continuation of the earlier growth patterns would soon bring a  number of
Latin  countries to  a phase of declining  inequality.  The  sharp  increase  of unskilled real  wages  in Brazil
during the  "economic miracle"  of the late  1960s and early 1970s suggests that fast growth may have a large
"trickle-down"  at the stage where such an economy now finds itself. A tempting hypothesis  is that several
of them are approximately  at a "turning point"  to labour scarcity;  every year that their attainment of that
point  is  delayed  by  weak  macroeconomic  performance  can  have  a  heavy  cost  in  terms  of poverty
unalleviated.
While  the picture  as  a whole  raises very serious  questions t about the implications of the sort of policy
package now being widely adopted in Latin America and elsewhere,  the fact that the two cases of sharpest
increases  in inequality are relatively high income countries with traditionally  moderate levels of inequality
and with strong systems of social services  means that the  social cost of increasing  inequality  has been much
less than it might have been. Comparable increases  in inequality  in the poorer countries of the region would
have had a much greater impact on poverty  and,  accordingly,  much higher  social cost. In most of those
countries many of the poor are found in agriculture,  so trends in their incomes would weigh more heavily
in the overall  distributional and poverty  outcomes than was the case in Chile and Argentina.
2. Something other than economic recessions has accounted for manor worsening of income distribution
in many LAC  countries.
Though  it  may  be true,  as  argued  by Morley  (1994)  that  economic  downturns  were  the  main factor
underlying the increases in inequality  observed in many LAC countries during  the 1980s,  this  conclusion
would not by itself imply that distributional  concerns can be safely left aside for the time being.  As noted
in section 2 above,  the 1980s evidence on the inequality-growth link appears to be somewhat less tight than
Morley judged it to be.  Still,  his conclusion that the best policy to reduce poverty in economies mired in
stagnation and underutilization  of capacity  is to  get the  economy  moving  is certainly  valid.  Our  main
76  For Colombia,  detailed data are presented in Berry and Tenjo,  1995,  Tables 4A and 4B.
239concern  here  is  not  with  that  issue,  nor  with  the  impact  of  crisis,  stabilization  and  adjustment  on
distribution;  the crises  are  hopefully  now history  and stabilization  and adjustment  were  necessary.  Our
focus is on the question of how economic reforms have affected distribution,  so the empirical evidence  on
which we rely  include  observations  from both before and after the whole crisis-stabilization-adjustment
sequence.  In Argentina,  Chile and Uruguay,  the main events occurred  in the  1970s;  in Mexico  and  the
Dominican Republic in the  1980's and in Colombia,  Ecuador,  Peru and Brazil  at the  end of the  1980s  or
the early  1990s. Our review of those countries where enough evidence  is available to say something on this
count  indicates  clearly  that,  though the  economic  cycle  has  certainly been a factor  in  some  countries'
short-run distribution patterns, most of the observed  worsening on which we focus here has other origins.
3.  While the causal relationships have  not yet  been  well  understood,  the close association  between
adoption of market-friendly economic reforms and accentuation of inequality is evident and a cause for
serious concern.
No definitive conclusions  as to what underlies the observed increases in inequality  can be derived from the
comparison  of  country  experiences  alone.  Drawing  on  both  those  experiences  and  the  limited
microeconomic  evidence on the various elements  of the reform package and on other hypothesized  causes
of worsening,  we tentatively  suggest  that ongoing  technological  change,  more open  trade regimes,  the
dismantling  of labour  institutions,  and  the  "socialization"  of  debts  (whereby  the  state  makeR  itself
responsible for certain private  debts which might otherwise threaten macroeconomic  or financial  stability)
have all had negative  impacts on distribution.  The effect of the scaling down of the public sector (directly
and via the privatization of public enterprise)  seems more open to question. Increasing  foreign investment
has also been proposed as a source  of worsening  (in Mexico,  for example),  but judgment  should probably
be reserved  on this point also. Many  questions remain with respect to how these various  factors  interact
among  themselves  and/or  complement  each  other,  both  in  terms  of  their  growth  effects  and  their
implications for income  distribution.
Trade and labour market reforms  have been consistent  elements of the reform packages  instituted in the
LAC  countries  where  distribution has worsened  significantly.  In each  case  it  is  easy to see  mechanism
whereby their effects on distribution might be negative,  and  in each  case there is at least  some empirical
evidence suggesting that those mechanism are at work. In the case of trade,  for example,  it appears  likely
that the comparative  advantage  of the region does  not lie in unskilled labour-intensive products.  Import
liberalization  appears  to  shift the  price vector  in favor  of better-off families.  Although  optimists  have
argued that the opening up of trade should be expected to raise the relative incomes of agricultural workers,
recent evidence on this point is not encouraging.  A significant feature of the 1984-89 period in Mexico  was
the contribution of a widening gap between urban and rural incomes to the overall increase  in inequality,
and  of the sharp  decline in income  from agriculture  and livestock as a  share of rural income  (Alarcon,
1993,  139,  148).  In Colombia an unprecedented  increase  in the gap between urban and rural  incomes has
appeared within the last two years,  coincident with the process of liberalization. It is increasingly  clear that
in such  countries  there  is  a major part of the  agricultural  sector which  cannot compete  easily  with  an
onslaught  of imports  and  whose  labour  resources  are  unlikely  to be  quickly  mobile  to  other sectors.
Meanwhile,  labour market reforms appear to open the way for wider wage and salary differentials  among
individuals. A tentative guess would be that these two elements of reform packages may underlie most of
the negative trends in distribution.
The "socialization" of international and other debts in order to save teetering financial and other enterprises
has doubtless had a significantly negative  impact on distribution, as shown in the case of Chile by Meller
240(1992).  This was,  however,  a crisis-response  policy, less germane  to our present concerns  than the now
ongoing  financial  liberalizations  (assuming  that such liberalization does  not henceforth  lead to  financial
crises as they sometimes did during the  1970s and  1980s--see  Diaz-Alejandro,  1985).  Solid evidence  has
yet to come in ar to their distribution impacts, but there are plenty of reasons to suspect that these could
be negative,  and that the optimists will here, as in the area of trade policy, prove to have been excessively
optimistic.
The impact  of foreign investment is another area in which the conventional wisdom, based on a two-factor
model in which an increase in the capital stock would raise the relative returns to  labour,  may be off base
for the LAC  region.  But further analysis will be necessary before much can be said with confidence  in this
area.
The downsizing  of the public sector is widely believed to be a factor  in worsening  distribution,  ar witness
the literature reviewed in the cases of Uruguay,  Chile and other countries.  There  is little doubt that many
middle income groups could lose  in this process.  But in some  countries (e.g.  Colombia) where there  is
detailed evidence  on the relative incomes  of public and private  sector employees,  the gap in favor of the
former  is large  enough  to make  one  guess that the  distributional  effect  would as  likely  be positive  as
negative.  Clearly  a  fairly  good  understanding  of the  indirect  as  well  as  the  direct  effects  of such  a
downsizing  are necessary for any predictions to be Persuasive.
4.  Neither  theory  nor the  record  has provided  much  evidence  on  how  "lasting" are  the  negative
distributional effects  which have been recorded.
This is a major drawback.  Enough of the economic reform episodes are recent 50 that it might be hoped
that many  of the accompanying  negative  effects  are temporary,  associated with  the transition  to a  new
model,  and likely to peter out with time and the adjustment of economic  actors to the new reality.  The only
ray of hope thus far in this area comes from Chile,  where distribution has improved noticeably  in the last
five  years  or  so.  But the period  between initial  worsening  and beginning  of improvement is  almost  15
years,  long by any standard,  and it is not clear that the recent improvement  should  be interpreted  as the
reversal of those initial impact or simply the result of another process, such as the tightening  of the labour
market predicted by labour surplus theory.  Even if the latter is  the case this outcome is  reassuring since
it might imply that distributional  losses  resulting from the economic reforms will, fortuitously,  be offset
after some time by other aspects of the growth process;  though distribution may  remain less equal than  it
would have been without the reforms,  it will not permanently  remain more unequal in absolute terms.
The need to better understand the likely future of income differentials  is thus further highlighted  by the
need to know what impacts are permanent and  which ones are not.
5. It is urgent to learn from the record, in order to achieve better combinations of growth and distribution
than those of the last two  decades.
All  country experiences  no doubt have valuable  lessons built into them, but those of Chile, Colombia  and
Costa  Rica are perhaps the most interesting from the perspective  of learning how  to guide policy  more
effectively  in future. Costa Rica is the one country which may have come through a reform process without
a major deterioration of distribution- Colombia  appears to have  achieved  the most significant pre-reform
Improvement in distribution, at least in the urban areas.  And Chile undertook the reforms earliest, suffered
high social  Costs thereafter, but has also pioneered a number of impressive policy  experiments of relevance
241to other countries.  Chile is of interest both for what went wrong and for what appears to have been done
right. Riveros,  for example,  emphasizes  in his contribution to this volume,  that the high social  costs were
due in part to the lack of a coherent labour market policy,  and the corresponding  lack of clear institutions
governing that market.
Possible lessons from Costa Rica,  assuming further analysis confirms  its status  as the happy exception to
the general  experience  of increasing  inequality,  might involve  some  or all  of that  country's  commonly
commented on special features:  its middle- of-the-road democratic governments,  the absence of a military
and  the relative  strong  system of social  services;  the  gradual  ways  in  which most  reforms  have  been
adopted;  the combination of union weakness (since the early  1980s)  with considerable  government control
over wageR and salaries;  the relatively high levels of education;  the low levels of unemployment.
6. Some priority policy  areas seem clear from the recent record in the LAC  region and from our partial
understanding of how  those  economies  are  now functioning.  Among  these  are  education/training
systems--clearly  important in light of the danger that low  skilled persons are being left behind; small and
medium  enterprise policy,  important given the major role this sector plays in the creation of productive
employment; poverty  redressal, whether through better targeting or otherwise,  in light of evidence  that
considerable social spending has not in the past been very  efficiently  carried out, and the fact that under
conditions of rapid economic  change such systems  must be unusually adept in order to do their  job well.
While their general importance  may be easily accepted,  the precise policy formula most likely to bear fruit
in each of these areas  is much less clear.  Designing it has obviously high priority.
Some progress has been made toward the goal of appropriate support the microenterprise  or informal sector
with the concerned assistance  of non-governmental  organizations  of both national and international  origin.
Less attention has been directed to the fairly small but not micro-level  firms;  there  is some  concern that
the trade, fiscal  and capital market reforms  will be applied  in ways  not conducive  to the success  of this
group,  whose potential  is little understood and whose interests have received little  attention from the key
policy makers  in most countries of the region.  In increasingly open economies  it will be important that its
capacity to export,  either directly or indirectly through effective  intermediaries  or through  subcontracting
arrangements,  be fostered;  evidence  from countries  like Korea  and Indonesia  strongly  suggests that this
will require proactive  government policy.77 Each of the major elements  of the economic reform package
already  instituted or now being  instituted  in the LAC  countries  also deserves priority  attention.  In most
cases there were reasonably persuasive arguments for reforms of the general character actually  undertaken,
though  in  all  cases  the  extent  of reform  and  the  precise  elements  making  up  the  package  could  be
questioned,  since the design was inevitably based on mainly untested theory. Now that the evidence  is clear
that the distributional  outcomes have been unfavorable,  and even the growth results rather more modest
than many had  hoped and  expected,  it  is  clearly  important  that each  component  be  reassessed.  It will
therefore be a challenge to design and to carry out necessary reforms with an eye  on avoiding significantly
perverse effects on income  distribution.  Together  with the importance  of more  careful  and professional
design  of policy  packager  will  be  prompt  and  in  depth  monitoring  of welfare  outcomes  and  their
relationships  to policy. For example if capital inflows are prone to worsen distribution in Latin America,
hints of this should become apparent in the not too distant future.
7  Based on the conclusions of an ongoing  World Bank study of the export success and support  systems of small
and medium manufacturing  firms in Korea,  Indonesia, Japan and Colombia (levy et al,  1994).
2427. Better information and more analysis in the distribution area will be needed  for  policy to become more
professional.
The full story on how the trauma of these past years ha affected the distribution of income,  poverty,  and
welfare in Lat. America and whether it will leave a permanent  imprint on those variables in future cannot
be  told until there  is better  information  on the distribution  of capital  incomes,  of aura incomes,  and  of
social services.  It is  conceivable,  though not likely in my own judgment,  that the capital  share has  risen
region wide by enough to suggest even more acute worsening then current available figures indicate;  it is
also possible that relative rural incomes have moved positively  enough  so that the record  reviewed here
appears unduly negative.  The fact that some welfare  indicator  other than recorded  incomes have evolved
differently,  and  usually  more  positively,  than  incomes  per  se,  is  reassuring  but  needs  to  be  better
understood.  It may mainly reflect the fact that there are significant lags between investment  and payoff in
these areas,  it may  imply that service provision fell significantly less than did expenditures  during the crisis
years (plausible  since wages are the main cost of education and those wages fell),  or it may suggest that
some  of the  improvements  (e.g.  in  child  mortality)  are  substantially  independent  of macroeconomic
performance and/or increasingly influenced by efficient targeting  programs.
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ON  Cl  l  - LTable 2:  Poverty Incidence by Country.  Latin America,  1970
Regional
Population (Millions) Percent  Incidence  of
Poverty
1970
Brazil  96  36.3  49
Mexico  52.8  20.0  34
Argentina  24.0  9.1  8
Colombia  21.3  8.1  45
Venezuela  10.6  4.0  25
Peru  13.2  5.0  50
Chile  9.5  3.6  17
Uruguay  2.8  1.1
Ecuador  6.1  2.3
Guatemala  5.2  2.0
Dominican Republic  4.4  1.7
Bolivia  4.3  1.6
El Salvador  3.6  1.4
Paraguay  2.4  0.9
Costa Rica  1.7  0.6  24
Panama  1.5  0.6  39
Nicaragua  2.1  0.8
Honduras  2.7  1.0  65
Latin Americab  264.2  38.53
Source:  Altimir (1982).
252Table  3:  Summary of Distribution Data for Chile:  Gini Coefficients  and Quantile Shares
_______  Greater  Santiago  Chile_____  _____
Year  I  R  Hhy  Share  H  H  a  Share  I Hhcb  I  Hh(ED  2  0%(3Y  4  7  8
(EO)  (2)3)  (1(8
1957  .48_____  _____  _______  ___
1958  .50_____  _____  __  ___
1959  .50_____  _____  __  ___
1960  .48  .459  13.69  ______________
1961  .51_____  _____  __  ___
1962  .51_____  _____  _______  ___
1963  .50_____  _____  _____  _______  ___
1964  .48__________  _______  ___
1965  .49  .475  12.87  _____  _____  _____  _____
1966  .49
1967  .52
1968  .52  .498  11.70  .____  __________  455c
1969  .52  ____  ____  .312
1970  .52  .501  11.50  .434
1971  .50
1972  .46__________  _______  ___
1973  .46__  ___
1974  .46  .450  12.78  .423
1975  .48  .471  .413  _____
1976  .53  .538  .489
1977  .52  .526  _____  .476  ____  ________
1978  .51  .520  .466  .485  10.77  .390
1979  .51  .518  _____  __________  ____
1980  ____  _  .526  10.28  __________
253Greater  Santiago  Chile
Year  R  Hhy  Share  HC  THya  Share  Hhcb  IHhy
(EOD)  (2)  40%  (4)(40%(7)  1(8)
(1)  (3)_(6)
1986  .539  10.00  .500
1987  .531  10.22  .495
1988  .573  10.91  .501  .519  10.91  .428
.487'
1989  .552  11.61  .500  .522  9.95
.454'
1990  (.54)  .514  10.26
.460




Symbols:  R-distribution  of income  among  income  recipients
Hh-distribution of household income  among households  ranked by household income
Hpcy-distribution of income among persons ranked by per capita household income
Hh-distribution of households ranked by household income  or consumption  (not clear--see  note  "b").
a) Gini coefficients calculated from quintile distribution presented  in Ritter  (1992,  81).  The true Gini' s, based on the
ungrouped information, would be a couple of points higher. We assume the figures  of Cols.  1,2,  and 4 are based on
ungrouped  data (to verify).
b)  Figures  from Meller  (1992,  22)  suggest  that  families  are  ranked  by  family  income  (not  per capita  income  or
consumption).  Data from source are  for the bottom  and middle  40%  groups and the top quintile.  Accordingly  they
underestimate  the  Gini  coefficient  considerably.  There  may  even  be  a possibility  that  the  ranking  criteria  were
different  as among the years  for which the figures  are reported.
c)  Average of two figures  for  1968.
d) Figures  estimated on the basis of the data presented in Ritter (1992,  81).
Sources :
Col. 1:  CEPAL,  1987).  Whereas  the other figures  in this  column were estimated by CEPAL's Division of Statistics and Quantitative  Analysis,  an alternative figure  (0.49) was presented  for  1973;  it was  estimated by the  "Programa  de
Actividades  Conjuntas  "ELAS/CELADE".
254Table 4:  The  Quintile Distribution of Consumption  Among Households  in Greater  Santiago,
1969,  1978 and  1988
(Percent of total  consumption)
Quintile  1969  1978  1988
1  7.6  5.2  4.4
2  11.8  9.3  8.2
3  15.6  13.6  12.6
4  20.6  21.0  20.0
5  44.5  51.0  54.9
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0
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zTable 6:  Evidence  on the Distribution of Income  in Uruguay
(Gini Coefficients,  except as  indicated)
MontevideoIUruguay
Year  Rural  Coeffic. of Variation
Hh  Hhy  hMn-le  Mn-ht
1961-62  0.366
1963  0.371  0.424
1967  0.418
1968  0.369  30.59  36.99
1976  0.450  0.450
1978  15.48  35.30
1979  0.491
1980  0.424  ____________  ______
1981  _____  _____  20.60  19.10
1982  0.415  __  ____  0.398
IL  1984  0.484  0.406
Hhy  Distribution of household  income among households  ranked by income
Hhye  Distribution of earned  income  among households  ranked by income.










Table 7:  Selected  Data on Distribution in Mexico,  1984,  1989,  and 1992
1984  1989  1992
Share of  Gini and  Share  of  Gini  and  Gn  n
Total Income  Psuedo  Gini  Total Income  Psuedo GiniPseoGn






























* Calculations  are based on grouped data.  Households  are ranked by total household income.
a  From Alarcon,  1994,  112.
b ibid,  p.  87,  121.
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Gini  and
Psuedo  GiniTable  8:  Measures of the Inequality of Wage Income in Mexico,  1984,  1989,  and  1992
1984  1989  1992
All Wage  Earners
Standard Deviation of Log Variance  1.036  0.978  1.299
Standardized Theil*  0.039  0.031  0.047
Gini Coefficient  0.419  0.443  0.519
Coefficient of Variation  0.930  1.092  1.319
Rural ware Earners
Standard Deviation of Log Variance  1.144  1.0241  1.145
Standardized Theil*  0.051  0.032  0.038
Gini Coefficient  0.471  0.433  . 0.466
Coefficient of Variation  0.964  0.908  1.064
Urban wave Earners
Standard Deviation of Log Variance  0.912  0.841  1.331
Standardized Theil*  0.031  0.024  0.047
Gini Coefficient  0.383  0.411  0.514
Coefficient cf Variation  0.870  1.020  1.288
Urban Manufacturing  Wage Earners
Standard  Deviation of Log Variance  0.770  0.835  1.320
Standardized  Theil*  0.026  0.024  0.048
Gini Coefficient  0.369  0.411  0.528
Coefficient of Variation  0.960  1.018  1.437
* Theil's L index divided by the natural logarithm  of mean monthly wages
Source:  Alarcon and McKinley,  1994, Table  5.
Table 9:  Selected Data on the Structure  of Earnings in Mexico.
1984,  1989,  and 1992
1984  1989  1992
Wage  differentials
Female/Male  76.7  71.6  74.7
Rural/urban  55.6  45.6  55.1
Nontradables/tradables  85.8  97.3  107.7
Nonunion/union  75.1  86.1  96.8
Nonborder  states/border states  93.6  93.6  95.2
Poor states/nonpoor  states  91.8  82.2  86.5
Source: Alarcon  and McKinley,  1994,  Table  3.
259Table  10:  Income Distribution Trends in Colombia Since  1976
Year  Persons Ranked by  Earners, 3 Citiesa  Persons Ranked by  Urban Households
Per Person Family  Per Person Family
Income,  Income,  Urban
3 Cities a,  Areas",
March  September
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
1976  0.520  0.500_0.496
1978  _0.483
1980  0.492  0.464  0.46  0.461
1983  0.46  0.459
1984  0.475  0.442




1989  0.470  0.421  0.50
1990  0.459  0.413  0.49  _________
1991  0.483  0.451  0.48  _________
1992  0.494  0.468  0.450
1993  0.507  0.467
a Bogota,  Medellin and Barranquila.
b  The data refer to the major urban centres  of Colombia plus a few small  centres.
CRefers  to June;  methodology  not comparable  to that for earlier observations  (communication  from L.  Sarmiento)
Sources:  Columns  1 and 2 are  calculations  by  the  authors  using  DANE  household  surveys  for  March  of  each
year.  Income  has  been  corrected  for  truncation  problem  (see  appendix  on  methodology).  Column  3
is from Sarmiento,  1993,  p.  73.  Column 4 is from  Reyes,  1987,  p.  81.
260Table  11:  GINI Coefficients  of the Distribution of Income Among Earners,
Various  Income Components,  1976-1993  (March)
Bogota,  Medellin  and Barranquilla
Labor  Income  Business  Income  Other Income  TOTAL
Year
GINI  Weight  GINI  Weight  GINI  Weight  GINI
1976  0.439  67.27%  0.577  26.13  0.829  6.60%  0.500
1980  0.373  63.77%  0.565  28.39  0.841  7.84%  0.464
1984  0.360  58.25%  0.510  27.35  0.644  14.40%  0.442
1989  0.341  57.20%  0.487  27.63  0.606  15.17%  0.421
1990  0.346  58.89%  0.466  28.74  0.688  12.37%  0.423
1991  0.371  56.09%  0.513  30.19  0.631  13.72%  0.451
1992  0.370  55.04%  0.533  29.47  0.694  15.49%  0.468
1993  0.374  54.92%  0.547  31.06  0.651  14.00%  0.467
Notes:  The  Gini  coefficients  for  total  income,  labour  income  and  business  income  are  in  each  case  calculated
for  that group of individuals receiving  the  type of income  in question and on the basis  only  of that type of
income.  Thus  a  person with labour income  and other income  would  appear in the labour income  distribution
as having  only his/her labour income. " Note that the surveys  do not collect  both labour and business  income
for  anyone,  i.e.  it  excludes  this possible  income  combination  from consideration  and thus it  leaves  and
unknown amount of income  unreported.
Source:  DANE household  surveys.
Table  12:
(A  vailable from Author)
261Table  13:  Indicators of the Concentration of Income in Costa Rica,  1969-1993
Households  Ranked  by  Households  Households  Earners  Households  Households
Per Capita  Incomea  of paid
_______  _______(Trejos-Saurna)  _____  w______  orkers  _____  _______  ______
Total  Urban  Rural  Toab  otaic  Total  Totals  Totalc
1969  _____  ____  ___________  ______
1970  _____  ____  ______  ____  ______
1971  __________  0.44_____
1972_____  ____________  ______  _





1978____________  __________  _
1979  _____  _____0.45  _____
1980  0.348  0.325  0.310  ______  0.395
1981  ___________  ______  0.403  ______
1982_____  _  0.42  0.420
1983  0.337  0.317  0.330  0.47  ______  0.383  _______  _____
1984  ___________  ______  0.376  ______
1985  0.322  0.293  0.316  ___  ____  ______  0.375  ______
1986  _____  ______  ______  0.372  ______
1987  0.363  0.336  0.353  ___  ____  ______  0.360  ______  _____
1988  0.369  _______  ____  0.420  ______
1989  0.348  ________  ____  0.419  ______
1990  0.348  0.324  0.337  ___  __________
1991  0.361  0.334  0.352  _______  ______  _____  __  _____  _____
1992  0.348  0.333  0.334  _______  ______  _____  __  _____  _____
1993  0.354  0.334  0.339
Note:  Except  as indicated,  the GINI coefficients  for houiseholds  are calculated  on households  ranked by  household  income,  not by
262Table 14:  Summary of Relationships  Between Economic Reforms  and Distribution,
Countries for Which Data are Available
Country  Main Period of  Degree of  Degree of  Characteristics  of
Worsening  Worsening,  worsening,  to  main Period of
main period  present  Worsening
Argentina  1976-78  8 points,  8 points  Liberalization,
(Greater Buenos  Aires)  followed by  labour repression,
some easing  no net growth
Chile  1974-76  7-9 points  7-9 points  Liberalization,
(Greater Santiago)  labour repression,
sharp recession
Uruguay  1976-79  or  1982-84  9 points or 7  not available  Liberalization,
(Montevideo)  points  labour repression,
growth or
..  ..... ,  recession




Dominican Republic  In period 1984-89  8 points  not available  May have coincided
with adjustment
Colombia  1990-92  4-7 points  4-7 points  Liberalization,
(Three major cities)  labour market
reforms,  moderate
growth
Ecuador  1989-92  5 points  5 points  Liberalization,
(Urban)  labour reforms,
slow growth
Costa Rica  1985-87  (?)  0-4 points (?)  0-3 points  Liberalization,  mild
labour reforms  (?),
moderate  growth
Note:  (i)  Distribution worsening measured  in percentage  point  increases of the GINI coefficient.
(ii)  Depending  on  data  availability,  the  Gini  coefficient  may  refer  to  income  earners,  households
ranked  by  household  income,  households  ranked  by  per  capital  income,  or  other distribution  available.
Completeness  of income  coverage  varies with the case,  as discussed in the text.
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